Good afternoon.
My name is Sujata Dey, and I am responsible for the Council of Canadians' international trade campaign.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you about the Canada—United States—Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA, from outside the country. As you said, I am in Guadalajara where this agreement is known as T-MEC. But you have my word that I am here by chance.
With more than 100,000 members, the Council of Canadians was founded on the heels of the debate over the first free-trade agreement between the United States and Canada. It was THE major topic of debate in the elections of 1988.
As many have said, a number of things have changed since 1988. At the time, our organization, just like the Liberal Party and the NDP, in fact, was concerned about Canadian sovereignty. Nationalism was the issue.
Decades later, many of our concerns are the same as they were in 1988: downward pressure on our social protections and regulations, privatization and deregulation of the public sphere, and the way these deals contribute to lowering conditions for workers and the environment.
It is not just about Canadian values. It is about how free trade, as codified in these agreements, protects the interests of multinational corporations rather than those of people and the planet. As Maude Barlow, our chairperson, wrote, “The most important thing both the FTA and NAFTA did was to create North American economic integration...and the country origin of these companies meant less and less. So it was less about where the company originated than the way it used these trade agreements.”
Often when these trade agreements are conceived, they're framed very strictly: winners and losers, industries and markets. Yet, these agreements reshape our democratic rules and our societies, not just our global markets.
With President Trump's renegotiation of NAFTA, we inherited the same model. Again, the bulk of the conversation was on supply chains and trade volumes. While there were attempts to involve civil society, this was not the central part of the agreement. Neither were MPs, our democratic representatives, implicated in the hatching of this agreement. Indigenous partners were not on the same level as states.
As such, we have an agreement that may contain some improvements, but that is still sorely lacking in many areas. That is sad because this is happening at a time when we have global problems such as growing wealth inequality, which is leading people to choose the path of dangerous populism. There is a very real climate crisis, and these issues should also be addressed in trade agreements, not undermined by them.
When I spoke to this committee in 2019, just before the federal election, I noted that we were very happy to see a few important changes. Over 35,000 of our members wrote to MPs asking for some of them.
ISDS, or the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, has been taken out of the agreement, at least for Canada and the U.S. This investment chapter gives corporations the right to sue governments over their policies. NAFTA made Canada the top ISDS target: It became the developed country with the most cases against it. As most of these cases were focused on environmental regulations, this hampered Canada from taking bold climate action.
All over the world, ISDS is becoming more unpopular. From now on, Canada must not accept this clause in any of its agreements, whether in CETA—where it is very contested—in the CPTPP or in any similar mechanism proposed at the WTO. It is simply too dangerous.
As well, the mandatory energy proportionality provisions that mandated us to export a quota of energy to the U.S. have been removed from the new NAFTA. That will give us more policy room to meet our G8 and Paris commitments.
The cultural exemption has been strengthened and now applies to the digital industry. The Council of Canadians and le Réseau québécois sur l'intégration continentale wrote an open letter in defence of this principle. The letter received support from Margaret Atwood, Susan Swann, Jane Urquhart, Ronald Wright and Jack Stoddart. In Quebec, support has come from France Castel, Dominic Champagne, Philippe Falardeau, Pierre Curzi, Micheline Lanctôt, Yann Perreau, Lorraine Pintal and Michel Tremblay, among others.
Indigenous artists like Marco Collin and Tantoo Cardinal are among those who support the principle.
In the spring of 2019, there was a panic to ratify the agreement as soon as possible. In June, Council of Canadians members wrote to their MPs urging them to wait for the Democrats in the U.S. Congress before they finished improving the agreement. Our members were also concerned about the biologic provisions that would make drugs more expensive. This would add to the cost of an eventual pharmacare program. Luckily, those provisions were removed in the democratic process. Labour provisions were also strengthened, so we feel it was definitely worth the wait, but there are still serious problems with the agreement.
The chapter on regulatory cooperation may appear harmless, but it is not. It actually allows private interests to participate in a process parallel to the parliamentary and democratic process. That imposes new requirements on those responsible for the regulation in terms of defending the new policies. If that process is not adequate, states can challenge the regulatory measures through the dispute settlement regulations.
CETA has a similar voluntary co-operation chapter that is much less stringent than the one in the new CUSMA. Together with foodwatch, a European advocacy group, this week we revealed documents under an access to information provision that showed just one of the meetings of this regulatory co-operation committee. It showed that Canadian regulators were successful in challenging sometimes higher European Union animal and plant legislation, as well as legislation on pesticides and herbicides. They were also using this committee to attack the precautionary principle, which is used in the EU.
In this committee, Canada has regularly done regulatory co-operation with the U.S., but now the new CUSMA codifies it. The documents showed that in many cases Canadian regulators were unwilling to discuss the issues with the EU because they were very concerned about harmonization with the U.S. This is alarming for citizens, because it suggests that these committees, rather than protecting our human and animal safety, protecting us from toxins and trying to prevent harm, are using this chapter to weaken regulations. We need checks and balances in this implementing legislation, including parliamentary oversight of these eventually industry-created committees.
On farming, much has been said about attacks on supply management and quotas for American dairy products entering the Canadian market. At the Council of Canadians, we're also worried about the standards of additional U.S. milk coming over the border. In the 1990s, we successfully campaigned to end the licensing of bovine growth hormone here in Canada. This hormone makes cows produce 25% more milk, but at the expense of cow health. BGH is used in the U.S. and is not labelled. We must ensure that the labelling of BGH happens or that there are restrictions on milk produced with BGH and sold in Canada. This will be particularly challenging because Canada and the U.S. have already successfully used the WTO forum to challenge European bans on hormones.
As well, we've often mentioned the environmental chapter. Yes, it's binding, but it doesn't even mention climate change. It doesn't do much on pollution, and it does nothing to prevent corporations from shifting to places where regulations are laxer. UNDRIP is not part of the agreement, nor is water protected.
We're here now to get a better agreement. To get a better agreement, trade must be done differently from the start. Citizens and parliamentarians must be let in. Having worked on trade agreements with NGOs in Europe and the U.S. for the last five years, I've noted that their processes are more debate-oriented and there's much more consultation. This has not occurred by accident, but by design. In Canada, the amount of participation is at the discretion of the federal cabinet. There's no requirement for anyone to be consulted until the implementing legislation, the point where we are now. The result is that these agreements are more tilted away from democratic oversight and into back rooms.
In both the U.S. and Europe, the negotiating objectives are published and debated by lawmakers. In the U.S., the negotiating objectives are in the trade promotion authority fast-track law itself. At several stages of the process, NGOs and stakeholders are mandated to participate, through the committee process or even their own negotiating round. Lawmakers are also involved in the negotiation process, and the negotiating texts are shared. In both the EU and the U.S., economic impact studies are conducted before the process is completed.
In Canada, there is no mandatory economic analysis; it is rarely done. As a result, in two of our agreements, with South Korea and—