International Trade Committee on Feb. 18th, 2020

[Rachel Bendayan, Liberal, Outremont, QC]

I'll read it in French.

I believe that you have French and English, recto-verso, in front of you.

I move:

That: (a) the Chair of the committee write, as promptly as possible, to the Chairs of the following standing committees to invite them to undertake a subject-matter review of the following provisions of Bill C-4, An Act to implement the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States and the impacts of provisions relating to their respective mandates;

(i) the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food, clauses 44, 46, 53 and 59;

(ii) the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, clauses 22 to 38, 108 to 113;

(iii) the Standing Committee on Natural Resources, clauses 207 to 212;

(b) for the Standing Committees listed in (a),

(i) if a standing committee listed in (a) chooses not to consider the subject matter of the provisions, it advise the Chair of the Standing Committee on International Trade by letter, in both official languages, no later than 4:00 PM on Friday, February 21, 2020.

(ii) that the Standing Committee be requested to convey recommendations, including any suggested amendments, in both official languages, in relation to the provisions considered by them, in a letter to the Chair of the Standing Committee on International Trade, in both official languages, no later than 4:00 PM on Tuesday, February 25, 2020;

(iii) any amendments suggested pursuant to paragraph (b)(ii) shall be deemed to be proposed during the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-4, and further provided that the members of the Standing Committee on International Trade may propose amendments notwithstanding the recommendations received pursuant to paragraph (b)(ii);

(c) that proposed amendments to Bill C-4 be submitted to the clerk of the committee in both official languages no later than 12:00 pm on Tuesday, February 25, 2020;

(d) that the committee proceed with the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-4 no later than Friday, February 28, 2020, provided that the Chair may limit debate on each clause to a maximum of five minutes per party, before the provision is put to a vote;

(e) that if the committee has not completed the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-4 by 11:59 pm on Friday, February 28, 2020, all remaining amendments submitted to the committee shall be deemed moved, the Chair shall put the question, forthwith and successively, without further debate on all remaining clauses and amendments submitted to the committee, as well as each and every question necessary to dispose of the clause-by-clause consideration of the Bill, as well as all questions necessary to report the Bill to the House and to order the Chair to report the Bill to the House as early as possible.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

All right, thank you very much. That is on the order paper. I suggest that we try to find 15 minutes at the end of our meetings today to discuss all of the three motions that are in question today.

We will now move forward with our witnesses in this section. From the Business Council of Canada, we have Brian Kingston, vice-president of policy, international and fiscal. From the Council of Canadians, we welcome Sujata Dey, trade campaigner, national, here via video conference from Guadalajara, Mexico. From the Canada West Foundation, we have Carlo Dade, director, centre for trade and investment policy.

Thank you all very much.

We will start, please, with Brian Kingston for the Business Council of Canada.

[Brian Kingston, Vice-President, Policy, International and Fiscal, Business Council of Canada]

Madame Chair, committee members, thank you for the invitation to take part here today in your consultations on Bill C-4.

The Business Council of Canada represents the chief executives and entrepreneurs of 150 leading Canadian companies in all sectors and regions of our economy. Our member companies employ 1.7 million Canadians, account for more than half the value of the Toronto Stock Exchange, contribute the largest share of federal corporate taxes and are responsible for most of Canada's exports, corporate philanthropy and private sector investment in research and development.

It almost goes without saying, and I've said this many times before in front of this committee, that trade with the United States is absolutely critical to our prosperity. The Canadian economy depends on international trade, clearly, and the U.S. is by far our largest trade and investment partner. Trade of goods and services represents around 64% of Canada's gross domestic product, with the U.S. the destination for 75% of our goods exports last year.

The Business Council strongly supports CUSMA/USMCA and calls for the swift passage of Bill C-4, for four critical reasons.

The first is that the agreement protects market access. When negotiations were first launched, we had one overarching recommendation for government and for our negotiation team, and that was to do no harm. To avoid damaging employment, trade and investment, Canadian, American and Mexican businesses need to retain their preferential access to markets and commercial opportunities in each respective country. By this measure, CUSMA is an overwhelming success. The resulting agreement is based upon reciprocal access and treatment, and no Canadian company will face new tariffs or other market access barriers in North America as a result of this deal.

Given recent reports that the White House is considering raising its WTO bound tariff rates, the importance of quickly ratifying this agreement is even greater. I just might add that, at the beginning of these negotiations, the overarching U.S. objective was to “[i]mprove the U.S. trade balance and reduce the trade deficit with the NAFTA countries.” In other words, the U.S. wanted to restrict imports, not liberalize trade, as is usually the objective in a trade agreement. Given that this is where we started, the final deal achieved the number one objective for the Canadian business community by protecting our market access and doing no harm.

The second reason that we strongly support this agreement is that it removes uncertainty from the Canadian economy. The ratification of CUSMA eliminates significant trade uncertainty. According to the Bank of Canada, protectionist trade measures around the world right now are estimated to reduce global gross domestic product by about 1.3% by 2021. Given that the U.S. remains the key market for Canadian firms that are planning to grow and invest abroad, reducing uncertainty in this critically important relationship will be a boost for the Canadian economy at this time.

The third reason is that the agreement modernizes NAFTA, and this tends to get overlooked at times. CUSMA will improve the trade relationship by modernizing long-outdated elements of NAFTA. The agreement is largely based on the text of the trans-Pacific partnership, which is our most modern trade agreement. For example, there are chapters on digital trade that prohibit customs duties and other discriminatory measures from being applied to digital products, while ensuring that data can be transferred across borders. This is a significant improvement on NAFTA and something to be applauded.

The fourth reason is that it enhances North American competitiveness. CUSMA includes new chapters and provisions that will help us develop a more productive and mutually beneficial relationship, including a chapter specifically on competitiveness and one on good regulatory practices. We call on government to take advantage of these new mechanisms by developing a robust committee work plan.

Before I conclude, I'll just say a word on timing. The U.S. and Mexico have moved to ratify this agreement in their respective legislatures. While we have every right to review and assess the deal, I caution against unnecessary delays. Given all the challenges facing the Canadian economy right now, including rail blockades, coronavirus and our deteriorating relationship with China, the last thing we need to add into that very concerning mix is a delay on this deal with our most important trade partner.

I'll conclude with that, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much, Mr. Kingston.

We'll move on to Ms. Dey from Guadalajara, Mexico. We have you on video conference, of course. You look great sitting there. We were concerned we might lose our connection, so it's important to make sure that you get your full time with us today. Thank you.

[Sujata Dey, Trade Campaigner, National, Council of Canadians]

Good afternoon.

My name is Sujata Dey, and I am responsible for the Council of Canadians' international trade campaign.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you about the Canada—United States—Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA, from outside the country. As you said, I am in Guadalajara where this agreement is known as T-MEC. But you have my word that I am here by chance.

With more than 100,000 members, the Council of Canadians was founded on the heels of the debate over the first free-trade agreement between the United States and Canada. It was THE major topic of debate in the elections of 1988.

As many have said, a number of things have changed since 1988. At the time, our organization, just like the Liberal Party and the NDP, in fact, was concerned about Canadian sovereignty. Nationalism was the issue.

Decades later, many of our concerns are the same as they were in 1988: downward pressure on our social protections and regulations, privatization and deregulation of the public sphere, and the way these deals contribute to lowering conditions for workers and the environment.

It is not just about Canadian values. It is about how free trade, as codified in these agreements, protects the interests of multinational corporations rather than those of people and the planet. As Maude Barlow, our chairperson, wrote, “The most important thing both the FTA and NAFTA did was to create North American economic integration...and the country origin of these companies meant less and less. So it was less about where the company originated than the way it used these trade agreements.”

Often when these trade agreements are conceived, they're framed very strictly: winners and losers, industries and markets. Yet, these agreements reshape our democratic rules and our societies, not just our global markets.

With President Trump's renegotiation of NAFTA, we inherited the same model. Again, the bulk of the conversation was on supply chains and trade volumes. While there were attempts to involve civil society, this was not the central part of the agreement. Neither were MPs, our democratic representatives, implicated in the hatching of this agreement. Indigenous partners were not on the same level as states.

As such, we have an agreement that may contain some improvements, but that is still sorely lacking in many areas. That is sad because this is happening at a time when we have global problems such as growing wealth inequality, which is leading people to choose the path of dangerous populism. There is a very real climate crisis, and these issues should also be addressed in trade agreements, not undermined by them.

When I spoke to this committee in 2019, just before the federal election, I noted that we were very happy to see a few important changes. Over 35,000 of our members wrote to MPs asking for some of them.

ISDS, or the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, has been taken out of the agreement, at least for Canada and the U.S. This investment chapter gives corporations the right to sue governments over their policies. NAFTA made Canada the top ISDS target: It became the developed country with the most cases against it. As most of these cases were focused on environmental regulations, this hampered Canada from taking bold climate action.

All over the world, ISDS is becoming more unpopular. From now on, Canada must not accept this clause in any of its agreements, whether in CETA—where it is very contested—in the CPTPP or in any similar mechanism proposed at the WTO. It is simply too dangerous.

As well, the mandatory energy proportionality provisions that mandated us to export a quota of energy to the U.S. have been removed from the new NAFTA. That will give us more policy room to meet our G8 and Paris commitments.

The cultural exemption has been strengthened and now applies to the digital industry. The Council of Canadians and le Réseau québécois sur l'intégration continentale wrote an open letter in defence of this principle. The letter received support from Margaret Atwood, Susan Swann, Jane Urquhart, Ronald Wright and Jack Stoddart. In Quebec, support has come from France Castel, Dominic Champagne, Philippe Falardeau, Pierre Curzi, Micheline Lanctôt, Yann Perreau, Lorraine Pintal and Michel Tremblay, among others.

Indigenous artists like Marco Collin and Tantoo Cardinal are among those who support the principle.

In the spring of 2019, there was a panic to ratify the agreement as soon as possible. In June, Council of Canadians members wrote to their MPs urging them to wait for the Democrats in the U.S. Congress before they finished improving the agreement. Our members were also concerned about the biologic provisions that would make drugs more expensive. This would add to the cost of an eventual pharmacare program. Luckily, those provisions were removed in the democratic process. Labour provisions were also strengthened, so we feel it was definitely worth the wait, but there are still serious problems with the agreement.

The chapter on regulatory cooperation may appear harmless, but it is not. It actually allows private interests to participate in a process parallel to the parliamentary and democratic process. That imposes new requirements on those responsible for the regulation in terms of defending the new policies. If that process is not adequate, states can challenge the regulatory measures through the dispute settlement regulations.

CETA has a similar voluntary co-operation chapter that is much less stringent than the one in the new CUSMA. Together with foodwatch, a European advocacy group, this week we revealed documents under an access to information provision that showed just one of the meetings of this regulatory co-operation committee. It showed that Canadian regulators were successful in challenging sometimes higher European Union animal and plant legislation, as well as legislation on pesticides and herbicides. They were also using this committee to attack the precautionary principle, which is used in the EU.

In this committee, Canada has regularly done regulatory co-operation with the U.S., but now the new CUSMA codifies it. The documents showed that in many cases Canadian regulators were unwilling to discuss the issues with the EU because they were very concerned about harmonization with the U.S. This is alarming for citizens, because it suggests that these committees, rather than protecting our human and animal safety, protecting us from toxins and trying to prevent harm, are using this chapter to weaken regulations. We need checks and balances in this implementing legislation, including parliamentary oversight of these eventually industry-created committees.

On farming, much has been said about attacks on supply management and quotas for American dairy products entering the Canadian market. At the Council of Canadians, we're also worried about the standards of additional U.S. milk coming over the border. In the 1990s, we successfully campaigned to end the licensing of bovine growth hormone here in Canada. This hormone makes cows produce 25% more milk, but at the expense of cow health. BGH is used in the U.S. and is not labelled. We must ensure that the labelling of BGH happens or that there are restrictions on milk produced with BGH and sold in Canada. This will be particularly challenging because Canada and the U.S. have already successfully used the WTO forum to challenge European bans on hormones.

As well, we've often mentioned the environmental chapter. Yes, it's binding, but it doesn't even mention climate change. It doesn't do much on pollution, and it does nothing to prevent corporations from shifting to places where regulations are laxer. UNDRIP is not part of the agreement, nor is water protected.

We're here now to get a better agreement. To get a better agreement, trade must be done differently from the start. Citizens and parliamentarians must be let in. Having worked on trade agreements with NGOs in Europe and the U.S. for the last five years, I've noted that their processes are more debate-oriented and there's much more consultation. This has not occurred by accident, but by design. In Canada, the amount of participation is at the discretion of the federal cabinet. There's no requirement for anyone to be consulted until the implementing legislation, the point where we are now. The result is that these agreements are more tilted away from democratic oversight and into back rooms.

In both the U.S. and Europe, the negotiating objectives are published and debated by lawmakers. In the U.S., the negotiating objectives are in the trade promotion authority fast-track law itself. At several stages of the process, NGOs and stakeholders are mandated to participate, through the committee process or even their own negotiating round. Lawmakers are also involved in the negotiation process, and the negotiating texts are shared. In both the EU and the U.S., economic impact studies are conducted before the process is completed.

In Canada, there is no mandatory economic analysis; it is rarely done. As a result, in two of our agreements, with South Korea and—

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much, Ms. Dey.

Sorry to cut you off, but you are running over your time limit. Thank you very much.

[Sujata Dey]

Okay.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

We'll go on to Mr. Dade.

[Carlo Dade, Director, Centre for Trade and Investment Policy, Canada West Foundation]

Good afternoon.

Madam Chair and committee members, before I start, I would like to thank you for inviting me to appear before you in order to present some viewpoints from the west. They are not just about NAFTA, because everyone is well aware of how important it is.

Instead, I'd like to talk about some of the things that need to be considered in our framework for understanding the agreement and in going ahead as the committee debates and, indeed, as the country looks on and debates participation in the new agreement.

The Canada West Foundation, as I'm sure the committee is well aware, was created 50 years ago to lend a voice to the western provinces, to facilitate the participation of the west and to facilitate the contributions of the west to the making of a strong Canada. A strong west is a strong Canada, and today, 50 years later, we realize that some of those debates have never gone away, and the Canada West Foundation remains engaged in them.

We are also one of the organizations most implicated on the trade file, given the importance of trade for the west. You will have seen our work on issues such as Bill C-69. Before it was a national issue, Canada West was there. You will have seen our work in forming the changes to the legislation.

On trade, we modelled the impact of the trans-Pacific partnership trade agreement on the Canadian economy before the federal government did. We continue this advance work. We are modelling the impact of the CPTPP on our trade infrastructure. Even though the government did this for CETA and has chosen not to do it for the CPTPP, the Canada West Foundation has stepped up to do this because of the importance of the agreement for the country, not just for the west.

On NAFTA, I have three points to consider quickly. These lead to my recommendations for action, about which I won't go into detail, because you have them in writing.

First is the rush toward normalcy in thinking about our relations with the Americans simply because we have an agreement. We have seen, time and time again, from the election of Donald Trump through his handling of diplomacy to his conduct of trade, a complete destruction and remaking of how the U.S. does foreign policy, diplomacy and trade policy.

Let me give you one example with this agreement itself. It's usually the process, with a trade agreement, to improve conditions of trade. Parties agree that there are things that can be done to improve conditions of trade, and they agree to meet, either starting from scratch or building on an agreement. We did this in North America. We updated the North American trade agreement to modernize it, to bring it into the 21st century, to take care of labour issues and intellectual property. We had a win-win situation, where all parties made concessions, and all parties were happy with the results. When Donald Trump came in, that was ripped up and we were told that win-win no longer works; what works is “I win, you lose.” Starting from this point is unprecedented in trade negotiations. We had no choice, and the government did the best it could—I think the best that anyone could. Hats off to the government for the job it did under those very difficult circumstances.

That is just one indication of how upended the world in which we are now trying to function is on the trade front. We see the U.S attacking the World Trade Organization. We can't proceed with our old ways of thinking, or our old frameworks, when looking at this agreement. Every witness you have has to tell how the agreement, and their interpretation, fits into this new reality.

Let me give you one example of something we are worried about. Yes, we have an agreement, and Brian is absolutely right: for those areas where the President does not pay attention, or pull the rug out from under us, or change the rules, the agreement will work. It is much better than not having an agreement. The modelling of the trade agreement done by others shows that the agreement is a net economic welfare loss for all three countries. The only thing worse is not having an agreement, which is an even greater economic and GDP welfare loss. I suggest you call in Dan Ciuriak, the modeller here in Ottawa. He does the modelling for Canada West. He used to work for Foreign Affairs. He can fill you in on the details of the modelling. That's a conversation I would strongly urge you to have, to get to the bottom of the modelling numbers and what they show.

Moving on to the statutory authority of the President, we have never seen a president exercise the four or five statutory provisions that the president has to manage trade. These are provisions delegated to the president from Congress.

We saw the steel and aluminum tariffs, Canadian steel and aluminum declared a national security threat. This is not the worst of what the President can do. There is more.

At the end of May, we woke up to see the following from the White House, and this is the White House statement:

As everyone knows, the United States of America has been invaded by hundreds of thousands of people coming through Mexico.... Mexico's passive cooperation...constitutes an emergency and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States.... To address the emergency...I am invoking the authorities...[in] the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Accordingly, starting on June 10, 2019 [less than a week after this announcement was made], the United States will impose a 5 percent Tariff on all goods imported from Mexico.... If the crisis persists...the Tariffs will be raised to 10 percent on July 1 [basically three weeks or 21 days later].... Tariffs will be increased to 15 percent on August 1, 2019, to 20 percent on September 1, 2019, and to 25 percent on October 1, 2019.

This is the threat that hangs over us should the President decide to ignore the rules and use the statutory power he has. This is something that really needs to be taken into consideration. We need to realize that the signing of the agreement is not the end of our fight on trade with the Americans and trade in North America. It's not even the end of the first period.

This is going to be a long-term game. We are going to have to step up the extraordinary efforts we made to build alliances in the States to prevent this type of situation. We do not fight this in Ottawa with the ambassador. We fight this in Boise. We fight this in Springfield. We fight this in Sacramento. We fight this at the state level where premiers work with our counterparts as governors, and MLAs work with their counterparts at state legislatures. It's imperative that we not drop the ball and think of this as mission accomplished.

The second point, very quickly, is that there are parts of this agreement that I think we really don't understand. I would highlight article 32.10, the article dealing with negotiating with non-market countries. The provision itself isn't problematic. We announce when we are going to negotiate and we have to share as much text as we think is possible—these are not onerous or unusual provisions.

But what is a non-market country? What did we agree to when we agreed that we would give the Americans these powers with non-market countries? We think it's China, but the Americans have a list of 11 countries—10 plus China. Who else is on that list? Well, Vietnam was on that list, and we dodged a bullet by getting the TPP done with Vietnam before the Americans were able to use this for mischief. Again, I would urge the committee to look at article 32.10. Do we fully understand it? Can the government fully explain it?

Regarding cultural exemptions, we've granted the Americans the right to impose countervailing duties should we invoke our abilities under the cultural exemptions. Michael Geist just had a long piece on this. I would urge you to call Michael, Wesley Wark and others, to really go into that.

As for the points I raise in the recommendations, we have to help the provinces do their job in terms of defending our interests in the States. During the negotiations, the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Prime Minister asked the provinces to do more. They stepped up.

The government gave money to ACOA to help the Atlantic provinces do more vis-à-vis the States. We haven't gotten the same in the west, and the west could really use the support. In a time of financial constraints, in a time of budget cuts, we are being asked to do more, and we don't have the resources, so we really could use the feds to step up.

There are also possibilities to engage the Americans on a bilateral basis for things that we couldn't do with the Mexicans at the table. The greatest failure of this agreement was not to advance provisions for moving business people. We can engage the Americans bilaterally, especially at the state-provincial, the regional level.

In terms of an infrastructure bank, the infrastructure idea is one where the Americans really need help. We can step forward and offer them help, and in so doing create a permanent institution with the Americans to avoid the vicissitudes of political changes and the changing political climate, and have a permanent institution focused on the North American border.

I will leave it there for questions.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much, Mr. Dade.

Thank you to all our witnesses.

We will go on to Mr. Lewis.

[Chris Lewis, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for coming today.

Let me just start by saying that, as far as we're concerned, rest assured that we are the free trade party, and we certainly do not plan on holding anything up. We want to get this and see it through to the end, and we're certainly excited to do that.

I think it's also important to understand that we need to do our due diligence, and my questions for you today are going to be a little bit different from what I've been hearing around the table. It's regarding implementation and what you specifically heard from the government, because, to some extent, we don't get all the information that we need. Specifically, it's about the implementation and how the CBSA is connected to that. Have you spoken to other companies that do a lot of cross-border trade? That's kind of where I'm going with this.

I'll start off by letting you know that my riding of Essex is literally a neighbour to the border at the busiest international trade crossing in North America, so I'm very much up to speed on that front, and I also spent 25 years with a company that did international trade. I used to type in all the wonderful little tariff numbers, so I'm quite up to speed on this file in that regard.

As a little bit of background, for those who don't know, the CBSA is the agency that oversees the secure entry and export of goods to and from Canada. The CBSA will be the agency that implements much of the CUSMA agreement as goods pass through the 1,200 points of entry and exit across Canada, and the terms of CUSMA are set to come into force on the first day of the third month following the last notification of ratification between the parties.

I have just a couple of quick questions and then I'd love to hear any thoughts you have on that.

I'm hearing from industry that they're concerned about the implementation, particularly about the 90-day transition period. Given that the CBSA is the agency that will implement much of the CUSMA agreement, and given that in the mandate letter for the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness there is no statement on the implementation of CUSMA specifically—there are five points on gun control but nothing on the implementation of CUSMA—do you have any concerns that the CBSA is not going to be ready for the first day of the third month? Have you heard any concerns about whether they're going to be ready to meet that?

[Brian Kingston]

One of the most complicated elements of this agreement is the rules of origin, particularly in the auto sector. There are much more stringent rules, but you also have a labour value content threshold that companies will now have to track throughout their supply chain.

This is hugely complicated and has direct implications for CBSA. I'm aware that discussions are under way with the auto sector and auto parts suppliers to do what is called the uniform regulations, which will help make this thing implementable, but given how complicated things are and how big an agreement this is, the timeline is tight, so I would share the concern.

There has to be a lot of work done between now and whatever ends up being day one of this thing being enforced. As with any trade deal, it's one thing to ratify it, but if you can't get it right on implementation day, you can create backlogs at the border, which we want to avoid.

I'm aware from our members that they're engaging and working with the government, and that work is under way.

[Chris Lewis, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Thank you.

Have you heard anything from the government with regard to any budget numbers for educating our businesses with regard to the new NAFTA numbers and those types of things?

[Brian Kingston]

I'm not aware of anything.

[Chris Lewis, Conservative, Essex, ON]

I don't know if that was a question that other people were asking. Would it be fair to say that you believe that Canadian businesses don't have a whole lot to be concerned about regarding the border crossing and/or the work of the CBSA starting on day one of this agreement being ratified?

[Brian Kingston]

I would say that, for most businesses, I'm not concerned. I think the auto sector is a group where that work needs to be done, and I'm not the best person to speak to it, but there's a lot to get done to make sure it's enforced correctly.

[Chris Lewis, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Okay, so here's a statement I'll make, then. I understand that there are going to be a lot of tariffs coming in and out. There are going to be a lot of things to learn. I'm not so sure that the CBSA officers themselves are ready to implement this.

I'm kind of looking at it twofold. Number one, is the CBSA ready? Is it going to have all the tools that it has at its disposal to make sure...? We can have the best trade agreement in the world, but if it takes months and months and months to implement, our economy is going to come to very much a grinding halt, and it's vital that we get this right way out front so that we're not stopping free trade going back and forth.

So my two big concerns are these. Number one, on the CBSA side, do they have the tools and the training to make sure that they're ready to go on their front? Then we need to ensure that our Canadian businesses and manufacturers, the ones who literally feed our families, aren't interrupted along the way.

I will ask one more time: Have those tough questions been asked of our businesses and/or the government from your perspectives?

[Carlo Dade]

Out west, obviously, we don't have the issue of all those. On the agricultural front, where I do have a great deal more familiarity with the line items, we haven't seen that many changes. Remember that under the original NAFTA most line items were knocked down to zero on the tariff front. Canada and Mexico already had very low tariffs to begin with.

Where we have seen changes on the agricultural front are things like grain grading, where we've agreed to accept American-grown varieties that are recognized in Canada. The Americans only grow three or four varieties that are recognized up here, so that's not going to impose a big hit on agriculture.

Running through the HS codes on agriculture, I can't recall any major cuts. There have been a couple of cuts in agriculture, but you look at the list of what goes back and forth, and it's not a lot. I think we should be okay on agriculture.

[Chris Lewis, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Sorry, Madam Chair, am I out of time?

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

You are, but you were on such a great line of questioning, I was allowing you to continue.

[Chris Lewis, Conservative, Essex, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Judy Sgro]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Bendayan, the floor is yours.

[Rachel Bendayan, Liberal, Outremont, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Allow me to thank Mr. Kingston, Ms. Dey, as well as Mr. Dade for their testimony and for their written recommendations.

Madam Chair, I'm in your hands, but it is 1:17, and I believe several motions and business matters are on the table.

[Randy Hoback, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

Take your five minutes and do your questions. If you want to extend it later, we're happy with that, depending on whether the room is available.

[Rachel Bendayan, Liberal, Outremont, QC]

I don't know if the room is available. I propose that we discuss the motions on the floor.