Good afternoon and thank you, Madam Chair and honourable members, for the opportunity to present the views of the Centre for International Governance Innovation, or CIGI, on World Trade Organization reform.
As you've heard, the WTO faces many challenges. Indeed, it is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy in each of its three core functions—negotiation, dispute settlement and transparency. More generally, the WTO finds itself struggling to respond effectively to the challenges of rapid economic, political, social and technological changes.
Multilateralism and rules-based trade co-operation are critical for Canada’s prosperity and relations with the world. As a middle power with a trade-dependent economy, Canada has both the incentive and the capacity to contribute enlightened ideas and to advance novel reform initiatives to the WTO. As we have also heard, Canada has done so with the creation and leadership of the Ottawa Group to guide WTO reform efforts.
I will first provide specific reform ideas within each of the WTO’s three core functions. Then I'll turn to areas where trade rules need to be modernized. More detail is provided in the background brief and in the CIGI WTO reform essay series that can be found on our website.
First, on the negotiation role, the WTO today is negotiating on a wide range of issues. Indeed, the trade governance agenda is almost entirely a “trade and” agenda, with a daunting list of “ands”. They include labour, gender, indigenous peoples, climate change and the environment, data, digital issues, e-commerce, human rights, development and intellectual property. It's hard to visualize the WTO dealing with these issues in their entirety, much less adjudicating disputes around them.
CIGI suggests that member states reinvent the WTO by abandoning the effort to manage so many “behind the border” issues that cover such disparate elements of economic and social policy. The “single undertaking” approach, whereby all manner of topics were pooled to make broad-based progress while allowing for trade-offs between them, should be ended.
Nevertheless, the WTO must continue to monitor these diverse areas. Indeed, all WTO member countries could be mandated and provided incentives to report trade impact assessments on these “and” issues to develop a better database for measuring the distributive consequences of trade measures. The WTO must also place a greater focus on facilitating negotiations and increasing barrier-free trade.
Although multilateralism is best, in current circumstances, a plurilateral approach is more workable and can help to build consensus among like-minded countries. An example of such an approach was the agreement of Canada, Chile and New Zealand on issues of trade and indigenous peoples.
The WTO can also work better with other international organizations—other stakeholders—and can create expert groups to develop consensus on technical issues. Bringing in the Group of Twenty, the G20, might be useful in helping to choose among the options and set a realistic course for WTO modernization. The G20 could also be used to achieve consensus and reach compromise on key issues over which the WTO is negotiating, and to help develop a new program of work for the WTO.
I will now turn to the dispute settlement system that has understandably attracted much attention. The impasse over the Appellate Body threatens the whole system and distracts from discussion of other improvements that would make the dispute settlement system more inclusive and effective for many members. In fact, for many WTO members, the WTO functions well.
The problem of the dispute settlement system stems from the relationship between the first stage in dispute resolution, which is the WTO panels, and the next stage, which is the Appellate Body. The standard for Appellate Body review should be reshaped more towards a deferential one, in which the reasoning and findings of panels are respected when they are of a bilateral nature—less involving third party interests—and those relating to technical matters.
While there's hope that the Appellate Body issue may be resolved with the appointment of a new director general, while it continues not to function there are other solutions. We've heard that Canada, with the EU and other countries, agreed to the multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement. In addition, members could follow no-appeal agreements and use dispute settlement mechanisms in other trade agreements.
Turning to the third core function of monitoring, effective trade co-operation depends upon information sharing of national measures that might affect trade. The current paralysis in the WTO is caused in part by insufficient information on which to pursue informed negotiations and deliberations.
Government notifications remain the most important source of information, and many governments face capacity challenges in complying with these requirements. Notifications can be improved by ensuring that information requirements are fit for purpose, and by providing support for building governments' capacity to gather and share information. The secretariat could also be tasked to compile this information. China presents a special case, especially with its subsidies notifications, but it could be encouraged to centralize notifications, make them in the original language and have other members “counter notify” China's measures from their own sources.
Then, the WTO trade policy reviews could be improved by making their timing more flexible, their content more targeted and detailed, and their discussions more probing.
Let me now turn to three areas in which trade rules need updating.
The first is development and trade. Addressing development issues will be important to successful WTO reform, including ways to provide flexibility in the rules for developing countries commensurate with their level of development, and building their capacity to take on new commitments. There is a need to encourage efforts to find solutions-oriented approaches to the controversial issue of developing country status and eligibility for special and differential treatment.
Next is digital trade. The digital transformation and the data-driven economy call into question numerous aspects of the WTO system. Digital trade goes well beyond e-commerce. It includes cross-border data flows, with implications for data and AI governance, competition, privacy, intellectual property and other areas. Much of the technical regulation in these areas must be developed through parallel processes outside the WTO and then fed into WTO negotiations.
We must also be wary of using regional trade agreements that can act as stepping stones into other policy spaces and become a multilateral standard. More generally, the WTO should not be the organization that determines the division of rents in the intangibles economy. Here, I would refer committee members to remarks I made to this committee on CUSMA in February 2020 in this area.
Finally, I will turn to what's referred to as TRIPS, the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
During decades of negotiation, all parties have recognized that the world trade system could not function without integrating intellectual property. The advent of artificial intelligence and the explosion of cross-border data flows changes the economics of innovation and the nature of trade, and thus requires a rethinking of TRIPS. This could be done in conjunction with the World Intellectual Property Organization and other international bodies, which could then feed into the implications for trade by the WTO.
In conclusion, there are many strategic choices awaiting the WTO. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the WTO's enduring strength is as a form of compromise, where consensus results are not always economically or politically optimal.
Thank you for your attention. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.