Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the witnesses.
I'll start with Mr. Manucha. It's nice to have somebody here who knows trade and constitutional law. I'm going to ask you a question along that line.
It's fair to say that Canadian courts have taken a generous rather than a legalistic approach in interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It probably started with the Big M Drug Mart Ltd. case, which we all had to read when we were in law school. Chief Justice Dickson stated that charter rights must be interpreted generously and purposively in light of the underlying objectives.
That led to what some critics called the start of judicial activism. Add to that the more recent development of courts applying a charter values framework to find, for example, that a territorial government had to provide French-language education even to children who were clearly not section 23 rights holders. Never mind what the charter actually said. What was the intent? That brought judicial activism to a new level.
When it comes to interpreting sections of the old BNA Act and the Constitution Act, 1982—I'm thinking of section 121, the so-called free trade section of the old BNA Act—courts have taken a very narrow approach to reject initiatives by people, with the Comeau case, for example, or by legislators, for example with the national securities regulations deal.
What are your thoughts on that?