It's a pleasure to do so. Thanks very much for the invitation to appear before this committee.
I am a researcher with the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. We've been around since 1980, pursuing social, economic and environmental justice policies that would push us in those directions. I direct the trade and investment research project there, which was established in 1999, right around the time of the battle in Seattle, which pushed back against some of these global trade rules that we're talking about today.
I'm going to make a few broad points that I hope have relevance to both of the committee's studies right now: the one with respect to the CUSMA review and the one with respect to the rules-based international order.
We're very preoccupied, as I know everyone at this committee is, with the trade wars we're seeing right now from the United States and the deindustrialization that we're seeing in this country, which is very much on purpose. It's part of what Trump is trying to do to this country. We're very concerned about that.
With respect to the rules-based order, I'll make a few points.
The order established by the WTO and the web of trade agreements we've had in place since the early 1990s have been contested pretty much from the beginning. I don't think it was ever settled. It never congealed. It's been a site of contestation from the beginning—for good reason—whether in the streets through public protests in Hong Kong, São Paolo and Cancún, or else in academic discourse and in government policy rooms. The belief that these rules reflected a universal truth about the limits of governing in a free market economy was, I think, hubristic from the beginning. We're starting to see the effects of that, and we're starting to see people realizing that at this point.
We took a relatively flexible system for regulating global commerce in the GATT—a system that acknowledged, for example, how imbalances in production may become an economic and political problem or burden for countries, and that allowed states to negotiate temporary safeguards, like import quotas or tariffs—and we built a rigid set of overlapping treaties that locked countries into policies that, if followed strictly, pretty much stunted industrial development and enshrined corporate rights to the detriment of other international priorities and rights, like creating good jobs, preserving high environmental and public health standards, having high wages, upholding human rights and indigenous peoples' rights, and so on. All these other international obligations took a back seat to never-ending growth and the fantasy of perfect market competition within and between nations. The system was built to fail, and we should not mourn its passing.
Obviously, we need rules to avoid beggar-thy-neighbour policies that help domestic jobs and domestic investors by harming other people's jobs and other people's investments. I would say that's the MAGA model, the Trump model.
There's something the government can do here through reforms to our own trade remedies policy, as other witnesses have pointed out to this committee recently.
Unifor, Canada's largest private sector union, has called on Canada to deploy other measures, like the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, to penalize companies that use the excuse of tariffs to move their capital into the United States, as we're seeing with companies like Diageo or Futura Tool and Die right now.
At the same time, Canada should play its part in the world as a fair dealer. We shouldn't just go around breaking rules willy-nilly. We should abide by commitments we have made related to tariffs and market access. In other areas, like procurement, excessive intellectual property rights or excessive limits to how we regulate or set industrial strategy, we need to be prepared to bend and, in some cases, break some of the more unreasonable rules, as other countries are doing. Let's be honest.
My second point is that preserving the old rules of free trade is contradictory to Canada's efforts to forge a transformative industrial strategy. Buy Canadian policies, in particular on large construction and infrastructure projects, are a no-brainer, with minimal, if any, impact on trading relations. Everybody else is doing it. European nations don't lose sleep when they give contracts to European companies, and I don't think we should either. I think they'll understand if we start to do this in a more systematic way.
We've also seen the European Union now following Canada and Mexico in putting steel tariffs in place to protect its own industry. There is some shifting of these strict rules. None of this is WTO-compliant, just as Canada's retaliatory tariffs on Trump in the early days—which I think were a good idea—were not WTO-compliant, but they were necessary to protect Canadian jobs. They were necessary to protect our economic security, to use Trump's language.
The third and final point I'll make is that rules-based trade should help workers, as well as companies. We have successes to build on, like the rapid response labour mechanism in the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement. This is producing results for workers in Mexico, but it needs to be shielded and expanded to cover Canadian and U.S. workplaces as well, so that we can start to discuss extending the system in other countries. We can't do that unless we're also committing to these same rules that we're applying in Mexico.
In light of the new Canada-Mexico action plan, I think it would be beneficial to strengthen co-operation with Mexico in areas like human rights as well, by supporting the protection mechanism for human rights defenders and journalists, which is under the jurisdiction of the Mexican government. This benefits Canadian businesses by giving them greater assurances that their Mexican operations are not going to be involved, perhaps involuntarily, in human rights violations.
Finally, I would say that Canada needs to withdraw from the investor-state dispute settlement regime, which neither promotes nor truly protects investment in other countries or in Canada. International investment arbitration is the opposite of rules-based trade in many respects. Its practitioners are constantly expanding the rules on their own in arbitration, and they're constantly expanding corporate protections beyond the wishes of negotiating parties, with no demonstrable benefit in terms of added investment, especially sustainable investment. It's anti-democratic, and it undermines legal reforms in those countries that would better provide security and business stability.
Those are my comments for now. I appreciate this opportunity. Thank you.