Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to announce to the committee, without wanting to surprise anyone, that the Bloc Québécois is going to support this amendment. It is an amendment that exhibits genius in its own way, given that the rules were not easy and that having just one clause made the scope quite limited.
It think when our work is done, after this amendment, there will be a few lessons to be learned. It should be pointed out, first of all, that conditional sentencing is not used all that often in our justice system. We know for a fact that only 5, 6 or 7% of convictions give rise to a conditional sentence. Despite what some people have suggested, in all of our deliberations and discussions with witnesses, there has been no basis for this committee to find that conditional sentencing is overused.
As a matter of fact, the Canadian Criminal Justice Association pointed out to us that only 38% of conditional sentences involved property offences. Furthermore, if you combine offences relating to the administration of justice and offences relating to the Highway Safety Code, the total is over 50%.
There are very effective limits on conditional sentencing. So we can't share the government's concern. What worries the Bloc Québécois more and causes us to support this amendment is the issue of the 10-year marker. The list the government has presented is completely lacking in differentiation. This had better not happen again in future bills. The government is going to have to work with a bit more intellectual dexterity, flexibility and skill. The witnesses certainly told us the 10-year maker was obviously too general.
One of the witnesses gave us the example of breaking and entering. There is a difference between an individual who commits a burglary in the middle of the night on Darling Street, in the riding of Hochelaga-Maisonneuve, and a former spouse attempting to recover assets that are part of the family property. Under the Criminal Code, it is the same offence, but the situations are completely different.
Obviously, that does not mean legislators have to refrain from sending messages. I think you and I will agree on that. There are things I like about Ms. Barnes' amendment. A person who spends a number of years working with Ms. Barnes in committee may discover that she has quite a subtle personality. Of course, she may occasionally come on a bit strong, but who can claim to have gone through public life without ever taking a bit of a stand? I suppose the same thing goes for deputy ministers. When you have responsibilities, there are times when you have to be assertive.
Unless you want to be on the overly long list of spineless people—and here, I am not going to name any names on this committee— there are some positive aspects to be found. A witness whom you probably hold in high regard, a member of the Montreal Police Force, told us it was acceptable, in some cases, to provide some guidelines. Cases of terrorism were mentioned. In that connection, let's recall Bill C-36. I am not suggesting here that we are in favour of security certificates. Whatever the case, that is another debate, and we look forward to reading the Supreme Court's report on that.
My Bloc Québécois colleague, the highly talented Serge Ménard, who is clearly not the only talented person of that name in our caucus, has taken a position. We agree that in some circumstances, judges have to be given guidelines. We still have confidence in judges. That may be a factor that sets the people on this side of the table far apart from those on the other.
Terrorist and organized crime offences are a very good example of situations where new law has to be created. I remember meeting with senior officials from the Department of Justice—and it was not you, madam, but some of your colleagues—who were confident the major organized crime networks could be dismantled simply by using the conspiracy provisions.
As the member for the riding where the car bomb went off, costing the life of young Daniel Desrochers, aged 11, I certainly knew that new law had to be created, a new offence.
In cases of terrorism, organized crime and personal injury offences, as described in section 752, the use of conditional sentencing is not desirable. In closing, I would like to say that one thing really disappointed me on this committee. Throughout our deliberations, people have implied—and I may feel obliged to put a question to the parliamentary secretary and to Ms. Kane—that conditional sentencing, as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx, was not a sentence of imprisonment. Mr. Chairman, a conditional sentence is a prison sentence. This is so true that if you go to the trouble of re-reading Proulx, the 94-page judgment concurred in by the majority and delivered by Justice Lamer, you will see that a judge has to give reasons for his or her judgment.
It even says—and you will correct me if I am mistaken, Ms. Kane—that reasons must be given for a decision to impose a conditional sentence or not to impose one. In addition, the Supreme Court says there are three conditions: ideally, there should be a curfew and electronic surveillance, and there are, of course, all of the minimum conditions, including keeping the peace and being of good behaviour.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I am going to put a question to our parliamentary secretary and to Ms. Kane. Are you a deputy minister? If not, I hope you will be.
In light of the Proulx decision, do you think that we, as parliamentarians, can properly consider conditional sentences, as set out in section 742 of the Criminal Code, to be tantamount to sentences of imprisonment?