Thank you.
I have a couple of questions on the structure created by the Supreme Court to generate the salary and allowances recommendations, the independent commission construct.
Notwithstanding section 100 of the Constitution, which says that Parliament shall set the salaries and remuneration—I'm paraphrasing—the Supreme Court decided that the whole effort should be turned over to an independent commission that would make recommendations, and not just as a consultative body; they were essentially nailing the numbers down. But for whatever reason, the Supreme Court then decided that report would not be sent to Parliament; it would be sent to the government, to the executive. I suppose that's understandable, though, because in modern times the executive is one of the major bus drivers of Parliament.
You may not have given much thought to it; however, could I ask you if we're going to have problems here with the existing mechanism created by the courts--in their own file, I may say? Could we reconstruct a mechanism that would have the body reporting to Parliament? Maybe the report ought to be sent to the Speaker and not the Minister of Justice, thereby pre-empting the executive of government role.That might sail through Parliament more easily than it would through the executive and then Parliament.
I'm prepared to hear that the Canadian Bar Association would never think of second-guessing the Supreme Court of Canada and would never have conceived of such an impudent proposal, but I'll take your answer.