Thank you, and for the record, the example I used, Mr. Rady, with paragraph 341(1)(a), that it would have been just as valid had it been a loaded handgun in those sets of offences, may be an education for those who might have been misled into thinking we were only talking about unloaded. I just showed unloaded to show the discrepancy in the legislation, and maybe that's a result of non-consultation and hastily drafted legislation, because I just couldn't believe it.
When I raised this in the spring in the first debate, there were Conservatives sitting in the House who were yelling at me that it wasn't true. But it is true, and it's there and it's a problem, one of the many problems in this bill.
Mr. Trudell, you've given us a last-ditch potential amendment there. First of all, I thank you for your efforts and your organization. The only thing I would caution all of us is that when a bill comes to us after second reading, like this, where it's been agreed to in principle by the House, it's often very difficult to go into another section or like principle and get that amendment through the legal counsel. But just for interest and for potential situations, I will put it through and see if that does meet the requirements, though I am concerned that it may not. Having said that, I certainly very much appreciate the thought and consideration that went into doing it.
I do want to talk about Askov. I asked the Attorney General here. On the Askov situation, tie that into a situation of when you get an increasing system of escalating sanctions, one, two, three. When does the behaviour of a defence attorney or a crown attorney change with respect to representation for the accused when you get that type of escalation in sentencing principles? Do any of you have information on that, and how will it impact, from an Askov perception, in your opinion...? You're the closest in the courtroom.