Members of the committee, we're pleased that you have invited us to participate in these committee hearings.
My name is Claire Farid. I'm counsel with the family law policy unit of the family, children, and youth section. With me is Lise Lafrenière-Henrie, senior counsel and coordinator of the family law policy unit.
We will provide you today with information about the technical aspects of the Divorce Act and Bill C-252. However, before turning to the specifics of the bill, we would like to discuss the general scheme of the Divorce Act with respect to custody and access issues.
As you're aware, the federal government is responsible for the Divorce Act and the custody and access issues that arise in that context. The provinces and territories are responsible for custody and access issues that arise in the non-divorce context--for example, for common-law couples.
Section 16 of the Divorce Act is the section that provides that a court may make an order for the custody of and/or access to a child. Subsection 16(8) provides that only the best interests of the child shall be considered by the court in making an order for custody or access. The child's best interests are to be determined in light of the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of the child.
Therefore, when a court makes an order for custody of or access to a child, it is required to look at all of the circumstances of the child and make the order that is best for that particular child.
Some of the types of issues that a court will generally examine are: factors related to the child, such as his or her age and views and preferences about the custody and access arrangement, the relationship that the child has with each parent and other significant people in his or her life, and plans that the parents have for the upbringing of the child.
It is relevant to note subsection 16(10) of the Divorce Act, which provides that in making an order for custody or access, the court must give effect to the principle that a child should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child, and must take into consideration the willingness of the person who is applying for custody to facilitate contact with the other spouse.
The Divorce Act therefore emphasizes the importance of the child's relationship with both parents. The particular access arrangement that is ordered must, of course, always be in the best interests of the child. Section 16 deals with original orders, and therefore looks at the circumstances of the child at a particular point in time. Those circumstances sometimes change, however, in a way that makes this original order inappropriate; thus, there is a need to return to court for a variation of that order. It is subsection 17(5) of the act that currently sets out the conditions for the variation of an order for custody or access.
There are two aspects of the inquiry under subsection 17(5). First, before the court can make a variation order, it must be satisfied that there has been a change in the condition, means, needs, or other circumstances of the child since the making of the last order. While subsection 17(5) of the Divorce Act simply refers to a change in the circumstances of the child, the Supreme Court of Canada has clarified that it is not any change in the circumstances of the child that will be sufficient for a court to consider the merits of a variation application. There must be a material change in the situation of the child. This requirement that there be a material change is to prevent parties from indirectly attempting to appeal or re-try the case by pointing to some minimal or insignificant change in the situation of the child.
In order to be a material change, the change must have altered the child's needs or the ability of the parents to meet those needs in some fundamental way. The change must be such that the previous order may have been different had the new circumstances existed at the time the original order was made. It's significant to note here that an important change in the life of a parent that is relevant to the child could be considered a material change in the circumstances of the child.
For example, in the 2002 case of Kazdan v. Kazdan, a mother was terminally ill and she sought to vary a Divorce Act custody and access order to dispense with her former husband's consent for her to travel to Israel with the children. The court found that the former wife's terminal illness and her resulting emotional need to travel with the children to Israel to see her family was a change in the circumstances of the child within the meaning of subsection 17(5) of the Divorce Act. The order was varied to allow her to travel, since it was found to be in the best interests of the children.
So the first aspect of the analysis under subsection 17(5) is to establish that there has been a material change in circumstances, which would then allow the court to consider the merits of the situation. Once this threshold has been met, the court must then embark on the second aspect of the analysis, which is to determine what order would now be in the best interests of the child. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, like under section 16, the court must seriously consider the importance of the child's relationship with each former spouse. Because both subsections 16(8) and 17(5) require that original orders and variation orders related to custody and access be based on the best interests of the child, the court must look at all aspects of the child's life to determine what order would be appropriate. The court therefore has broad discretion to fashion an order to ensure that the child's best interests are met.
Bill C-252 would add proposed subsection 17(5.1) to the Divorce Act to assist with interpretation of subsection 17(5) in circumstances where a former spouse has a terminal illness or is in critical condition. There are two elements to proposed subsection 17(5.1).
First, proposed subsection 17(5.1) would provide that for the purposes of subsection 17(5), a former spouse's terminal illness or critical condition shall be considered a change in circumstances of the child of the marriage. This aspect of the provision would have the result of deeming the terminal illness or critical condition of a former spouse to be a material change in circumstances. As a result, in cases where a former spouse has such a terminal illness or is in critical condition, the threshold requirement of subsection 17(5) will have been met, and the focus would be on the issue of whether a variation of the original order is appropriate.
The second element of proposed subsection 17(5.1) is that it provides some direction for the court with respect to the potential variation of the order. The bill states that the court “shall...ensure that the former spouse is granted access to the child as long as it is consistent with the best interests of that child”. Therefore, access between the former spouse and the child is to be ordered, as long as it is in the best interests of the child.
Since the best interests of the child are a prerequisite for making a variation order for access, the court would be required to consider all the circumstances of the child to determine whether such an order would be appropriate. In the context of this analysis, the court would also consider what type of access arrangement would be appropriate--for example, in terms of the frequency and length of visits, and who would be present at these visits.
We hope this information is helpful to the committee, and we would be pleased to take any questions.
Thank you.