Monsieur Ménard, that's a very good question, as well as the one you raised in the House about why section 403 of the Criminal Code would not address the problem that I'm raising. The best illustration is the situation in 2005 when Macleans magazine actually obtained the personal phone records of our current Privacy Commissioner from a data broker online—purchased those records. Now, if you look at that as a problem, in my view, obtaining her personal phone records is obviously a serious invasion of privacy. The commercial transaction in and of itself is an issue, but the fact that these records were obtained by someone through fraudulently impersonating someone else as a means to obtain these records is the problem that I looked at. In my view, section 403 did not adequately address this.
So the fact that I could obtain her phone records by presenting myself as someone else, obviously with an intent of either making commercial profit, which is one issue, or using these for instances that may then transgress the Criminal Code—obtaining that personal information was fraudulent, which my intent was to try to stop with this bill.