With respect to my comment that police officers under these provisions are acting under the law, just to be clear, technically they're acting under a legal provision, but they're acting largely as autonomous actors not subject to meaningful review or to serious accountability, given the way the scheme is structured.
With respect to your comments about the types of recourse that have actually been made to these provisions, if the concern here is to allow law enforcement agencies to engage in victimless criminal conduct--possessing contraband, falsifying documentation, and that sort of thing--then a narrowing of the provisions through subsection 25.1(11) could make that clear and thereby remove the justification for conduct that could involve serious bodily harm. As I said earlier, paragraph 11(a) prohibits “the intentional or criminally negligent causing of death or bodily harm to another person”. It doesn't eliminate death or bodily harm from the justification regime.
Manslaughter, for example, is an offence that does not require the intentional causing of death or the criminally negligent causing of death. If the police are entitled to threaten people, apply force to people, and an unforeseen consequence occurs--they're forcibly confining somebody or they're hitting somebody without intention to cause bodily harm and the person suffers a heart attack--it's classically a manslaughter if the underlying act is actually an assault. And these provisions, because of the very narrow restrictions in paragraph 11(a), would provide justification for such conduct.