I hope we can be helpful to the committee in dealing with Monsieur Ménard's motion. I appreciate the opportunity to provide the committee with some background on the issues raised by the motion that is before you.
I'll focus my remarks primarily on the first two issues raised in Mr. Ménard's motion.
As you know, Bill C-24 came into force in 2002, and I believe Monsieur Ménard was a member of the committee at that time. In so doing, it modified the definition of criminal organization. Subsection 467.1(1) defines a criminal organization as:
a group, however organized, that
(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and
(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group.
The amendment was made because the previous definition of criminal organization was a more complex and demanding definition. It required, for example, showing a pattern of criminality, which was found to be a difficult issue for crowns to deal with. There had been some development on the international level that I'll refer to a little later, and the new definition was largely based on that international development that led to a definition of criminalization in the transnational organized crime convention.
The concept of material benefit, as it has been interpreted, is quite broad, and sufficiently broad so as to address instances of gratuitous violence, such as drive-by shootings, the issue raised in Monsieur Ménard's motion. This view is confirmed by international legal norms as well as our own jurisprudence. From a criminal policy perspective, it's the inclusion of the requirement that there be a receipt of a material benefit for the offences that the criminal organization is focused on facilitating or committing that is important.
Mr. Chairman, as this committee is no doubt aware, the passage of Bill C-24 was aimed in part with the view to enable Canada to ratify this big international convention, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. That convention's definition of an organized criminal group also contains a requirement that the commission of serious crimes be done in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit. We have the definition available if the members of the committee would like to see it.
Similar to the issue before you today, the drafters of the convention struggled with those instances where organized criminals might commit crimes such as murders, which allegedly yield no direct material benefit to the organization. Proposals to broaden the definition to include other illegitimate purposes were suggested as a way to ensure that such acts were captured. However, in the end, the drafters concluded that the concept of material benefit must be construed broadly, and our own courts have confirmed this, and that the motivation for such criminal acts could nonetheless be seen as indirectly linked to the obtaining of a material benefit. The domestic interpretation has solidly confirmed this view.
It should also be noted that the concept of material benefit from a legal policy perspective serves to limit the range of groups that could be seen as criminal organizations but not be within the target of what the criminal organization legislation is designed to capture. For example, the concept of material benefit assists in differentiating organized crime groups from groups who commit crimes for reasons other than a material benefit, such as political reasons.
Mr. Chairman, domestic jurisprudence confirms that the concept of material benefit is broad and that the breadth of this section was deliberate so as to provide law enforcement with the necessary flexibility so as to capture the full range of behaviour engaged in by criminal organizations.
In decisions before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice as well as the Quebec Superior Court, the courts have noted that the term “material benefit” is broad, and that what constitutes a material benefit will depend on the facts of the case.
For example, in Regina v. Leclerc, Quebec Superior Court noted that activity that is intended to provide a gang with an increased presence in a particular territory in order to deal in narcotics would be for the benefit of a criminal organization. This indeed is what lies behind the drive-by shootings and other apparently random acts of apparently gratuitous violence, including those engaged in by street gangs. It creates a climate of intimidation that contributes indirectly to the drug trafficking or other forms of crime that result in the direct material benefit.
In addition, it should be noted that nothing flows directly from the definition of a criminal organization. It is not essential that the crime in issue before the courts be one that is included within the definition of a criminal organization. What is involved in using the definition of criminal organization is that there is an offence before the court....
For example, in section 467.12, there is an additional offence that is applicable if the offence in issue is one committed for the benefit of, in association with, or at the direction of a criminal organization. So you must have the offence and the existence of a criminal organization. The criminal organization exists if it commits or facilitates crime that brings material benefit--this broad concept of material benefit--whether or not it may also sometimes engage in purely random, or apparently purely random, acts of violence.
Having said all this, the issue that Mr. Ménard is raising in this element of the motion, the issue of drive-by shootings, is certainly a serious one. We have been reviewing our criminal laws with a view to ensuring that there are adequate tools within it to address in particular that kind of reckless criminal behaviour.
In regard to warrants for tracking devices such as GPS systems, that is something that we indeed have been looking at. We thank Mr. Ménard for raising that issue in the motion. We are looking for a variety of ways to strengthen our criminal law responses to organized crime. Certainly we are examining the exact issue he has raised in the second part of his motion.
The remaining issues involve primarily funding matters. We really can't comment on those except to note that indeed there is no funding presently available for the activities that the motion raises.
I'll make one comment, perhaps. The idea of a secure website, while certainly a resource-intensive issue, would certainly be feasible in regard to case law, but there are a variety of reasons why it would probably not be possible to put on a website evidence used by the defence and the Crown. That simply wouldn't be available to put on a website, but certainly case law would be available, although making it a secure website would be a fairly resource-intensive exercise.
Those are my comments, Mr. Chairman. I hope they will provide some assistance to the committee in reviewing Mr. Ménard's motion.