I answered this questioned a few minutes ago, but I'll answer it again.
I mentioned that under subsection 117(3), there is a requirement for the Attorney General's consent, and that authority has been delegated to the Director of Public Prosecutions. We have a deskbook called the Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook that we have been directed by the Attorney General of Canada, pursuant to a directive under section 10 of our act, to use. That deskbook contains a chapter on delegation that sets out the levels of delegation for cases in which the Attorney General's involvement or consent is required.
In the case of subsection 117(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, it's been delegated down to the regional director of an office.
In the case you've mentioned, our prosecutors, including the regional director, were presented with a crown brief prepared by investigators, as is the case with any case, which they were asked to consider for the purpose of consent. They looked at it with these two guiding principles in mind, and these are principles that are applied by all prosecution services in respect of any case that comes before them: Was there a reasonable prospect of conviction on the basis of the evidence they were presented with, and if so, was the public interest favouring the prosecution?
Our deskbook contains principles or considered relevant factors that must be taken into account in the application of both those principles. They applied those principles and made their decision to consent to the prosecution.
Subsequently, additional information was brought to their attention. Under the principles that guide their work, they are required to apply those principles on a continuing basis. So they examined this new information, and given this new information, they decided that there was no longer a reasonable prospect of conviction, and they introduced a stay of proceedings.