Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
The organized crime committee seeks to enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies at home and abroad, promote innovative law enforcement initiatives, and advocate for public policy and legislative change. On behalf of the Canadian law enforcement community, I thank you for providing us with this opportunity today.
This committee has invited me to discuss the current threat of organized crime in Canada and to identify challenges within the law enforcement community for its eradication.
As was reported to you last week, the law enforcement community has identified more than 900 organized crime groups operating in large cities and small towns in Canada. This is a substantial and growing problem. Today I hope to provide you with further information on the issue to allow for a deeper understanding of the challenges, what law enforcement has been doing to address the situation, and the legislative gaps that require our mutual attention.
Organized crime has significantly changed over the last five years in Canada.
While the drug trade remains a focal point of their activities, they have continued to become more sophisticated and diversified in their criminal activities.
Most are involved in more than one type of criminal activity which can range from drug crimes or financial crimes, such as identity theft, mass-market fraud and money laundering, to crimes such as human smuggling, human trafficking, and counterfeiting consumer products and medications.
While there are many factors at play in the acceleration of organized crime activity in Canada, the end result is that today Canada has been identified as a source country for synthetic drugs and a transit country for cocaine en route from North America to Asia. More worrying, and presenting an immediate threat to public safety, organized crime groups have escalated their use of violence in fighting for territory and shares in what have become very lucrative illicit markets. These groups have also come to rely on the corruption of public officials and using violence towards their rivals, potential witnesses, law enforcement, and the judiciary.
Many organizations have become more sophisticated in that they compartmentalize their operations and expand over a number of countries. They are relying on modern technology to communicate and to further insulate themselves from the reach of the law.
While there are many challenges, we have many examples of successful investigations through joint forces operations. These include the biker enforcement units, the Integrated Gang Task Force, and the combined forces special enforcement units, which are composed of law enforcement agencies from all levels, working on integrated investigations to address priority targets.
Inter-agency coordination is further enhanced by groups such as the national coordinating committee on organized crime, the CACP's organized crime committee, which I am here representing, and the CACP's law amendment committee.
A relatively new group that is showing great promise is the Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime, or CI-ROC, which was until very recently called or referred to as the Council on Public Safety. CI-ROC was created to enhance operational cooperation between law enforcement agencies across provincial borders with regard to organized crime operations. Coordination of these efforts is necessary to ensure that the use of limited resources and assets are maximized and that emerging threats are identified and addressed to preclude further growth of organized crime. While it is still relatively young, the potential impact of such a body is tremendous.
There are many successes and advances, but given the new realities I mentioned, Canadian law enforcement is challenged in their ability to investigate. As with most complex issues, a multifaceted approach is required. Ongoing, timely, intelligence-sharing facilitates effective and proactive program delivery and provides guidance in effective deployment of resources to tactical operations.
Enhancements to legislation must be explored along with the scrutiny of current judicial processes and outcomes to ensure an effective response to enforcement action. In the face of the challenges posed by organized crime, it is the CACP's position that law enforcement agencies must be given the power and the tools to keep pace.
There are three specific areas I would like to address. The first is the impact current disclosure requirements are having on criminal investigations. In a 1991 case, Regina v. Stinchcombe, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered prosecutors to disclose to the defendant before the trial all relevant information. “Relevant disclosure” is defined as the reasonable possibility that information could be used to meet the crown's case, advance a defence, or make a decision that could affect the conduct of the defence. Disclosure in Canada has become a significant exercise in criminal cases, and issues pertaining to relevant disclosures surface in most major cases today. This can have a significant impact on the cost and progress of investigations and prosecutions.
Courts, crown counsel, defence counsel and police officers across the country have varying interpretations of what “relevant disclosure“ is. Within our judicial system, the concept of relevant has been interpreted to the point where the threshold test for relevant disclosure is extremely low. As the investigation of criminal organizations has become complex, the management for purposes of disclosure has become more and more of a challenge. Consequently, this affects our capacity to investigate other criminal organizations.
A quick example of how expanding disclosure can affect an investigation. A few years ago, during a police investigation in Canada targeting a major organized crime group, 1.7 million pieces of communication were intercepted. Of those, 27,000 were transcribed. In the end, only 200 were deemed sufficiently relevant to the case to be used in court.
Investigations can produce an extraordinary amount of documentation. Significant policing resources are allotted to this duty, effectively removing them from front-line policing.
Further, the reality of the volume of disclosure has affected the capacity of law enforcement and prosecutors to attack organized crime as an offence in and of itself. In many instances, prosecution for substantive offences is preferred over organized crime charges. The legal framework and practices must evolve and embrace the efficiencies that can be provided by new techniques and methods such as those provided by electronic technology. Most importantly, there is a need to establish a well-defined and consistent threshold for relevant disclosure. This could be accomplished through enacting disclosure requirements and procedures.
The second area where we need to progress is the area of lawful access. While communications technology has evolved considerably and criminals are embracing and taking advantage of it, Canadian law has not kept pace with the rapid changes. Increasingly, complex technologies are challenging conventional lawful access methods. Communication carriers are not required to provide access technology. Law enforcement agencies are simply asking that telecommunication carriers build interception capability into existing or new networks and provide access to important customer name and address information.
The third and final issue I would like to address is the need for an increased ability to share information between government agencies, domestically and internationally, to eliminate havens where criminal organizations can flourish. The current environment is one of fear of sharing information, due to either legislative restrictions or human rights concerns. While it is essential to be careful in determining the appropriate information to share and the context within which it is shared or used, this can seriously impede the ability of law enforcement to investigate organized crime.
Organized crime operates from an international perspective. In fact, it can be demonstrated that organized crime is taking advantage of the infrastructure and legislation of certain countries. They are organizing to better insulate themselves. As an example, some criminal organizations have based themselves in India and China to forward precursor chemicals. Other organizations have sought refuge in Caribbean countries, while others are now infiltrating countries of the African continent to use as transshipment points.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, Canadian law enforcement is committed to tackling organized crime, and we need new thinking in the judicial process and new policies and guidelines to support these efforts.
On behalf of the CACP's organized crime committee, I am confident we can respond to the growing sophistication of criminality and together we can strike the right balance in our legal and legislative structures.
I also wish to compliment this committee on your plans to travel in the near future to several Canadian cities to discuss issues surrounding organized crime. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police strongly supports this initiative, which will allow the committee to get first-hand information from those who are on the front lines in dealing with organized crime. CACP is prepared to fully support the committee in this important work, and we will work closely with the clerk of the committee to facilitate these consultations.
I would again like to thank you for inviting me here today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have at the conclusion.