First, I would also like to thank the committee for giving me the opportunity to address it. I would like to note that I am before you here today as a professor of criminal law and also as the co-chair of the master's program on fighting financial crime, a program offered in Montreal. So I hope that I am somewhat neutral on this subject.
Before making my presentation, I would like to reply to the question that Mr. Lessard just asked, whether two-year minimum sentences might be considered to be consecutive where there are several frauds in one case. I think the answer is no, because when the Criminal Code provides for consecutive sentences, it says so specifically. We might think of firearms offences. It adds that the sentence for those offences must be consecutive. The same is true in relation to criminal organization offences. That is not the case here, so I don't think it could be seen as consecutive, at least not as that being mandatory.
My observations will address the six main points in the bill. I would like to start with the two-year minimum sentence. I think that there are in fact still fraud cases where judges are giving sentences of less than two years. We need only consider the Coffin case, which went to the Quebec Court of Appeal not so long ago, relating to the sponsorship scandal. So adding a two-year minimum sentences does have an impact, and I don't think it will mean downward pressure. Traditionally, when a minimum sentence is added, a section, judges increase the average sentence, they don't decrease it. So I do not anticipate a downward effect.
That being said, there are still problems. Ms. Joncas spoke here about the case of an accomplice. Obviously this is a problem. An accomplice does not have the same degree of responsibility as the actual perpetrator. An exception might be made for them.
Another even more important factor is the amount of the fraud. A minimum sentence is to be added for frauds of $1 million and over. In my opinion, that minimum sentence would not apply in cases like Vincent Lacroix's. Why? Because in Vincent Lacroix's case, even though his total fraud was $115 million, his individual frauds were all under $1 million. In that situation, all the counts would probably be for fraud under $1 million, and there would be no two-year minimum sentence on any count. Ultimately, it will not change greatly, because his total sentence will be more than two years. But in my opinion, taking the amount of the fraud into consideration is a bad idea, because if there are multiple victims, the fraud may exceed $1 million in total, but be less than $1 million for each victim.
Conversely, the amount of the fraud does not include the benefit to the accused. For example, if I sell buildings worth $2 million and I tell my clients I am certified by the APCHQ when that is a lie, even if I receive no benefit, even if I intend for the buildings to actually be built, that's fraud, and the amount of the fraud is equal to the value of the building, $2 million, even if the benefit to me personally is limited to my profit in the building. So setting the figure for the amount of the fraud at $1 million causes problems, in my opinion.
Even more importantly, adding a minimum sentence and increasing the maximum sentences—in the case of section 380 we have both—should be done more comprehensively. In this case, fraud is the target, but nothing has been done about sexual assault with a knife, under section 272 of the Criminal Code, or incest, under section 155 of the Criminal Code. Might society see this approach as creating a hierarchy of crimes? Might they not think, in the public's eyes, that fraud over $1 million is more serious than sexual assault with a knife, or more serious than incest? The message sent by the bill is that this is in fact the case, because there is a two-year minimum sentence for fraud.
So playing with parts of the Criminal Code, adding minimum sentences in some places and not adding them in others, might send a bizarre message. This should be done comprehensively. There is a justification for minimum sentences. They can be good, but this should perhaps be done more comprehensively.
Regarding restitution for victims, this adds little in my opinion, because it is already provided in section 738. So the bill makes no change in that regard. It simply imposes certain duties on judges. But in itself, it will not facilitate restitution for victims. The problem is still the difficulty of establishing the actual losses in criminal law, which will mean that in any event the victims will have to go to the civil courts.
As well, obviously there is the accused's genuine insolvency, or apparent insolvency. In the case of genuine insolvency, the accused has no money, they can't pay. In the case of apparent insolvency, you have to know where they have put the money. If they have hidden it in a tax haven, the restitution order won't change anything.
The addition to the list of aggravating circumstances is essentially a codification of current law. Here again, no additional protection is being offered to the public against fraud. It is worthwhile to codify the current law, but it should be done as part of a broader reform of the Criminal Code. Some parts of the Code are up to date and have really been improved, while other parts are not. For example, section 181, about spreading false news, which the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in 1992 in the Keegstra decision, is still in the Criminal Code. When we talk about updating the Criminal Code and a section that the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in 1992 is still in the Code, I think there is some work to be done on reform.
Regarding the fourth measure, entitled "Judge required to record aggravating circumstances and to state reasons for refusal to order restitution", I don't understand why that is required in the case of fraud when it is not required in the case of other crimes. Why should a judge be specifically required to record the aggravating or mitigating circumstances in a fraud case, but not be required to do it in a sexual assault case, for example? I find it hard to understand why this measure is being called for.
Measure 5, which is probably the most interesting feature of the bill, in my opinion, is entitled "Prohibition on having authority over the affairs of another person". As was noted earlier, this covers a much broader area than probation. Probation is for a maximum of three years and may be applied only where there is a prison term of no more than two years.
Here, that kind of limit is not imposed. If I am not mistaken, the model you have in mind is much more along the lines of the prohibition for driving while impaired. We know that in the case of drunk driving, the judge may, for example, order a 10-year or 15-year driving prohibition, or even a lifetime prohibition, upon conviction. In my opinion, it is a very good idea to want a similar measure for fraud cases.
Obviously, however, this raises the question of supervising orders prohibiting handling the affairs of another person. In the case of driving, it is relatively easy. There are police on the roads who can do random checks of drivers' licences. In the case of another person's affairs, does this mean that the person will be under a probation officer for the rest of the order? We can assume it does, but the idea is worthwhile and it is probably the measure in the bill that offers the most protection for the public. When we talk about preventing fraud, protecting the public, it is really the only measure in the bill that is clearly dedicated to that idea.
And the sixth aspect of the bill deals with the "Victim statement on behalf of the community". In my opinion, that already happens and the bill adds little to the current situation, other than that it might provide better guidelines for how it works.
In conclusion, I would like to make a more general comment on the bill. I agree with what was said earlier: people who commit fraud can be deterred. Fraud is not an impulsive crime like some murders or some sexual assaults. It is not a crime associated with drug addiction, like selling or possessing narcotics. It is ordinarily a well thought-out and planned crime. In this situation, the fraud artist often does a cost-benefit analysis. They consider the benefits of committing a crime and the potential costs. At this state, deterrence can play an important role. That being said, deterrence is based on two factors: severity of sentence and certainty of sentence. I see that here there is a lot of work being done on severity of sentence, and that is laudable.
However, if a person has a one in 100 chance of getting a 14-year sentence, the cost-benefit balance is still tipped in their favour. That is why the work must focus not just on severity of sentence, but also on certainty of sentence. Are we catching more fraud artists? Are we catching them faster? That could have a real deterrent effect.
I will conclude by giving you the example of Mr. Madoff in the United States. Everyone believes that a 150-year sentence in Mr. Madoff's case has a deterrent effect. When I read about the Madoff case, I kind of said to myself that I was sorry I had never done what he did. Why? Because he led an extraordinary life, in the best hotels and the best houses on the planet; the travelled, and led a life we can hardly even imagine. Obviously, he got 150 years in prison, but he is 70 years old. If I compare the costs and benefits, in his case, I am not sure there is a deterrent factor.
Thank you.