Thank you very much.
This is another rather technical question. It relates to the sentencing provisions for someone convicted of the crimes here in this bill, or the revised description of the crimes.
It's in subclause 26(2) of the bill, and it relates to section 810 of the Criminal Code, which is the longest numerical description of a Criminal Code section I've ever seen—section 810.1(3.02)(a.1). This has to do with the ability of a judge to prohibit a defendant from using the Internet or other digital network. I understand the Internet part, but when the bill refers to “other digital network”, I want to offer a scenario that for me creates a lack of clarity and might be problematic.
Because we just refer to any other digital network.... We're all aware of how many digital networks there are out there. They're all over the place: they're in hearing aids; they're in elevators, subway systems, automobile sensors, heart monitors. Digital systems are everywhere. If in setting out the penalties or the sentencing restrictions we are not specific, what if a judge simply says they'll use the words of the Criminal Code and you're prohibited from using the Internet or any other digital system, that's in his or her order?
That, I suggest, is problematic, because it lacks specificity about any of these other digital systems. Therefore, our failure to itemize the digital systems may handicap our judges in itemizing the restrictions in the sentence. If the sentencing restriction isn't specific enough, it will fail at some point. I guarantee, judicially, on challenge, it will fail.
Have I missed something here, or have we just painted over, in our zeal to impose more sentencing flexibility, something here? Could you comment on that?