Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the panel. My name is Randy Franks. I'm an inspector for the Toronto Police Service, and I work in organized crime enforcement. I'll speak about some of the issues facing Toronto.
Recent enforcement successes have had a profound impact on the behaviour of organized crime in Toronto. Between 2005 and 2009, a number of large-scale enforcement projects and initiatives have focused on the disruption of street gangs and other organized groups. Intelligence analysis of the enforcement initiatives indicates that displacement of criminal organizations throughout the GTA has been accomplished. This of course presents law enforcement with another challenge: properly identifying the relative success and failure of these operational initiatives and adapting these for greater future success.
The adaptation of these disrupted groups, as well as their evolution into more disorganized entities, also presents various challenges. Groups no longer act alone, are more fluid, with the subjects of interest playing a larger role in other criminal enterprises. With any illicit trade, groups strive to gain or maintain a competitive edge. Intelligence indicates that organized crime has embraced outsourcing and cooperation as the means to gain that competitive edge.
Recent enforcement initiatives undertaken by the Toronto Police Service and the OPP provide an example of the outsourcing and cooperative relationship between outlaw motorcycle gangs and more traditional crime groups. The biker groups appear to act as enforcers for debt collection. As recently as five years ago, organized crime groups tended to be self-sufficient, whereas now these groups are more likely to work with competitors in the presence of an attractive market.
One of these attractive markets is of course the United States of America. Increasing demand for ecstasy in the United States has prompted ecstasy producers in Canada to increase their production. Prices for ecstasy in the U.S. are double or triple the price that is received in Canada. As such, Canadian ecstasy distributors and producers profit greatly from selling the drug in the U.S. Due to this increase in production, divisions in Toronto previously impacted by ecstasy are finding greater risk due to wider availability in downtown Toronto, and that is one area that's been consistently impacted by ecstasy and related illicit drugs in 2008 and 2009.
The recent increase in ecstasy prices in Toronto has coincided with the increase and rise in the seizure of a drug called benzylpiperazine, commonly known as BZP. The effect of this drug is believed to be similar to MDMA, which is ecstasy, and the effects produced by BZP are comparable to those produced by other amphetamines. This past month 700 pills of BZP were seized by the Toronto police, and it is expected that future seizures may be larger due to an increase in the price of ecstasy. This drug is currently not a controlled drug in Canada, despite the identical appearance and effect to the more prevalent ecstasy.
Gang violence, especially firearms-related activity, is one of the bigger threats facing Toronto. Recent trends have shown violent crime migrating to the more heavily populated downtown core. Most alarming is the apparent infiltration of gun crime and gang violence in every neighbourhood across the city. However, the majority of gun deaths are still in the inner suburbs where gun culture is ingrained.
We find that street gangs are involved in drug trafficking, street and commercial robberies, home invasions, break and enters, firearms handling, shootings, and murders. The increase in gang-related homicides and shootings over the past decade can be attributed to the increase in the availability of restricted and prohibited firearms stolen from domestic sources and those imported illegally.
A review of the historical and current data systems have identified thousands of domestic firearms being illegally possessed at this time. The Toronto police initiated a project called safe city last March 1, 2009, and this was developed to address this issue. Since the safe city initiative commenced, there have been a total of 1,620 firearms seized. Of these firearms, 58% have been prohibited and restricted.
To quantify the success of this initiative simply by the number of firearms seized would not be an accurate measure of its far-reaching impact. It is unknown how many lives just one seized firearm can ultimately save and how that single seizure will impact the quality of life for individuals living within the city.
The safe city initiative has, at a minimum, identified a need within our city for the continued monitoring, education, and enforcement of the non-compliance of legitimate firearms owners. If left unchecked, illegal firearms will be left in these homes, where they could quite possibly be stolen and diverted to the illicit firearm market. For individuals who have chosen to ignore the provisions that exist within the Firearms Act, the Toronto Police Service will assist them in disposing of any unwanted firearms or in advising them how to obtain a valid firearms licence. Fewer firearms on the street will only prove to enhance community safety and assist in gun-related incidents.
One of the most important aspects of intelligence gathering and enforcement is in identifying the how, who, where, and why criminal groups and individuals should be targeted. This must be followed by an assessment of the effectiveness of the police response.
For the Toronto Police Service to be successful in disrupting organized criminal activity, it must adapt to the evolving criminal landscape. As the world shrinks socially, economically, and politically, criminal networks can become more diffuse, generating more linkages between criminals from different ethnic, social, and cultural groups. As previously seen in both social and environmental movements, law enforcement officials must continue to act locally. However, they must learn to think globally where enforcement initiatives are being developed.
Illicit markets often mimic those in such traditional commodities as gold, silver, oil, and minerals. One of the examples of that is metal thefts that occur when the price of metal goes up.
Market demands in foreign countries can often have influences over local drug markets. Producers of illicit drugs no longer have to adapt to changes on their street corners. They can instead look to new opportunities in cities south of the border or across the oceans.
The Toronto Police Service recognizes that criminal intelligence information only becomes vital when properly analyzed and shared. Intelligence-led policing, to be successful, must assist in identifying and prioritizing targets so that resources are used to the best effect. This is a model of policing in which an intelligence product serves as a guide to police operations. Since all organized crime groups are fluid and operate across jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement must do the same. Sharing of information is key, and with current systems not being used to their full potential, it is recommended that a new national data warehouse be established to share all timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence information.
Bryan spoke about ACIIS. I'm sure you're aware that ACIIS is being enhanced, and any support from this committee to that effort would be appreciated.
Finally, all law enforcement agencies, including the Toronto Police Service, must adapt to the increasing sophistication of organized crime. Criminal groups use the latest technology not only to further their enterprises, they also use this expertise to evade law enforcement. Something as simple as the use of social networking sites is one facet of organized crime communication that is not fully exploited by us in law enforcement. When virtual digital means of money laundering come into the equation, police agency initiatives are almost non-existent at the local level.
That's the Toronto Police Service.