Mr. Chair, I drafted the amendment because on my reading of paragraph (d) I found the wording arguably too vague, from two perspectives. One was the wording of the code itself, the actual wording of the provision. Secondly, in the hands of a court later, would the wording give rise to other potential ambiguity or vagueness there? I think members would accept that a material vagueness or ambiguity, either in the statute or in the court orders that would flow from it, would undermine the enforcement and the viability of those.
I was looking for greater precision in the order. Right now it reads “using the Internet or other digital network”. When you think about it, there are hundreds and hundreds of digital networks surrounding us. We're probably surrounded by half a dozen now as we sit in this room. Our automobiles are digitally network-connected. Our transportation is. Our heart monitors probably are. Our home burglar alarms are. It goes on and on. Our office communications systems are. Our telephones are. The list can go on.
I just found this much too vague. If a court were to adopt the wording here.... For example, if the court says “I'm ordering that you be prohibited from using the Internet or any other digital network for two years”, what would that mean to an offender when it came to enforcement? It could apply to any digital network.
I'm not saying that a judge is going to do that, but a judge could. If this is the wording of the code, a judge could simply take the wording of the code and use it in an order. We'd have all kinds of potential litigation about what networks should be included and what should not.
My amendment simply adds the words “specified by the court” after the term “digital network”. If an individual is going to be prohibited from using or relying on—even if it involves saving his own life—a digital network, the court must specify which digital networks are going to be prohibited. That's all my little phrase does: it attempts to force the code and the court to be specific and to specify.