Very briefly, Mr. Chair, I just wanted to clarify this for Mr. Comartin, because I think he misunderstood the point I was making earlier. The point I was making is simply this. We're dealing here with sentences of people who have been convicted of sexually exploiting a child in some way. A condition has been imposed by a judge. Now the opposition is saying that it needs the judge to actually specify every network these individuals are not allowed to utilize, so that if in the future they're found to be using some digital network, another judge won't find them not to be in compliance with their sentence conditions.
That strikes me as being the opposite of the argument they're typically making on the other side of this room, which is that we can rely on the discretion of the courts, that we don't need to tie their hands because they know the circumstances of the case, and that they're going to use their discretion judiciously so we can rely on them to impose the right sentence and we don't have to say in our legislation that it should be any kind of a minimum sentence. Yet in this case, they think that some judge is going to say—if I can use Mr. Lee's example—“Oh, this offender set his home alarm system, which operates over a digital network, so we're going to find that he's not in compliance with his sentence condition”. Then what...? Send him back to jail because he set his home alarm system?
That strikes me as saying they don't have much confidence in the discretion of the court. That was the point I was trying to make. I just want to clarify that for Mr. Comartin.
