Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Through you, Mr. Chair, I express my sincere appreciation to each of my colleagues for this opportunity to address the justice and human rights committee regarding my private member's bill, Bill C-576, personating a peace officer.
I'd like to start by saying that I appreciate the support received during second reading, which allowed this bill to be sent to your committee, and the willingness of my colleagues from all parties to carry this discussion forward.
As the committee is aware, I was moved to table this bill following discussions I had with the victim of a horrendous crime in my central Alberta riding of Red Deer. Flashing lights and a police uniform were used as weapons to abduct a 16-year-old who had just earned her driver's licence. This brave young woman was held captive for 46 hours and brutally assaulted before she managed to escape from her attacker. The cold fact of the matter was that she was abducted only because she thought she was doing the right thing. When confronted by someone she thought was a police officer, she did what she had been taught to do: she stopped and she followed instructions. And in this case, she ultimately lost any opportunity she might have had to protect herself.
When citizens see a police uniform, they naturally trust the authority that comes with it. Personating a police officer is a serious breach of the public's trust, and it has the same effect as using a weapon: it forces the victim to submit.
It has another effect that is also of great concern, not only for the general public but for the police who are out there trying to do their jobs. Mr. Chair, for this young woman, the police uniform no longer represents safety and security. With time, she will cope with this fear and will hopefully regain her trust in authority. But every time we hear of these types of incidents, one more person has had this trust shattered.
The police I have spoken to in my riding, both RCMP veterans and serving members, have also encouraged me in my quest to have the Criminal Code amended so that the personation of a peace officer in the commission of another offence be considered an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes.
This bill seeks to add one short section following section 130, which committee members will have before them. That is all it does. It does not seek to affect any interpretation of the offence. It would simply direct a sentencing court to consider an aggravating circumstance when dealing with the conviction under section 130.
To expand the discussion further, there are aggravating circumstances defined in section 718 that apply to all criminal offences. There are also some special cases of aggravating circumstances attached to specific offences within the code. To be clear, this bill seeks to be a special aggravating circumstance in regard to the specific offence of personating a peace officer.
Of course, within the parameters of the maximum sentence for personating a peace officer, the appropriateness of a sentence would still rest with the sentencing court. But it is up to us, as legislators, to establish sentencing provisions in the Criminal Code. Therefore, we should recognize that this is a crime that can have varying degrees of harm and therefore should be penalized accordingly.
I was aware that with the changes introduced with Bill S-4, the maximum sentence for personation was increased to five years from six months. The specific case I have outlined was dealt with prior to its passage, so there was only a six-month sentence allowed. But it did beg the question of whether personation of a peace officer is not just as serious to a victim as being abused by a person in a real position of authority, which is considered to be an aggravating circumstance.
Some of the specifics I encountered when I first started looking at this issue related to section 718 of the Criminal Code, which sets the principles of sentencing. In section 718.2, we see that aggravating circumstances would be involved if there was “evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim”. This would apply if an offender had an existing relationship with the victim, such as a teacher or a coach, or it would apply to a real police officer who may have abused a position of trust, but it doesn't apply to offenders who are posing as police officers.
I hope this committee will recognize this gap in the law and work with me to fill it through the acceptance of my private member's bill.
Mr. Chair, during debate in the House, all parties remarked about the lack of credence that was given to this type of public deception. It was only in the preparation of comments that the prevalence of this deceit in the commission of crimes in Canada was brought to a conscious level for members. For victims, it's always at a conscious level.
In section 130, the crime is in the deception of the public about a person's status as a peace officer, whether or not it was for the specific purpose of facilitating another crime and whether or not another crime is actually attempted or committed. But in cases where the deception is intended and in fact does facilitate the commission of another more serious crime, this is an extremely serious instance of the offence of personating a peace officer and therefore it deserves an appropriately high sentence.
In conclusion, let's give the sentencing courts the tools they need to apply appropriate sentences in serious cases and thereby seek to protect innocent people from these types of crimes.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members, for your prompt study of this bill. I am pleased to answer questions from members.