Thank you very much.
I have reviewed some of the previous submissions and it would be repetitive of me to reiterate the history of organized crime in Canada and how we got here, so my comments will be relatively brief.
But there is one particular point that I feel compelled to make. Those people who are involved in the mid-level and upper level of organized crime are in for one reason and one reason alone: profit.
Unlike other types of crime in Canada where addictions or stupidity may be the primary motivator, organized crime is motivated by greed and profit, and it relies on the continuous victimization of the naive and the innocent. Therefore, the government and the justice system must recognize that serious crime requires serious sentencing.
A criminal involved in serious and organized crime must be treated far more severely than the young, foolish male who finds himself in trouble with the law for a few years. Organized crime has serious social and economic consequences and we can't ignore the increasing impact on the Canadian economy and on Canadian society.
I want to speak to recent trends and some of the solutions I would suggest.
The first issue is diversification of organized crime groups, geographically and commercially. Whereas in the past organized crime tended to stick to one market, this is no longer the case. Groups will now be involved in any enterprise that makes money: human trafficking, prostitution, auto theft rings, debit card fraud, and mortgage fraud. Organized crime groups are no longer restricted to geographic areas or neighbourhoods and will cross all borders to pursue profits.
Organized crime groups are actively trying to corrupt and infiltrate police, the judiciary, and legitimate businesses. They are also actively working to unmask police sources.
The implication for law enforcement? As organized crime groups broaden their networks, they increasingly interact with each other, causing conflict and violence. Multi-faceted layers of criminal enterprise make it difficult for police to investigate, not only in terms of resources, but also in terms of in-house expertise. For instance, a simple drug file will lead to a complex fraud investigation requiring commercial crime expertise, tech crimes, etc.
Cross-jurisdictional crime trends make it necessary for different agencies--rural, municipal, corrections, CBSA, and sheriffs--to work together and share information. There are few processes and systems in place to facilitate information sharing.
There are some potential solutions to that particular issue. One is to facilitate exchange of information and intelligence between agencies through support to development of shared intelligence databases, analysis, and other resources. Another is to develop and support workable technology within the province and the country. The majority of law enforcement agencies use different technology and systems, which makes sharing of current information difficult.
To combat mortgage fraud, government needs to compel banks to discontinue their present desktop appraisal technique and develop new techniques that are designed to discourage mortgage fraud as opposed to facilitating it.
A second issue is disclosure. Two issues are associated with disclosure. One is that the Stinchcombe requirements use an excessive amount of police and judicial resources. Second, disclosure packages themselves are being used by criminals to uncover the investigative tactics of police.
Local intelligence reveals incidents of organized crime groups using disclosure laws to identify and respond to police investigative tactics. There have been instances of disclosure packages being disseminated in jails. Organized crime groups have also been known to hold what they call “heat meets”, in which they discuss recent trends in police surveillance and the means to counter them.
There is a heavy onus on police and crown, such that it's virtually impossible to run an organized crime trial of any complexity in a province like Alberta. You virtually cannot try more than four people at once.
The implication for law enforcement is that counter-surveillance is becoming a huge issue. Counter-surveillance is their ability to identify the police and how they're responding to their particular crime issue. Traditional police investigative tactics are no longer as effective as they once were because they've been distributed to all the criminal elements, especially in organized crime, so they can study it and figure out a way to get around it. It significantly limits our ability to conduct large organized crime trials.
Potential solutions include: a review of the Stinchcombe decision for the purpose of simplifying disclosure for police and, where appropriate, masking police techniques so criminals cannot study them and develop counter-investigative strategies; the promotion of technological tools that address issues around the volume of disclosure; and increased federal prosecutorial capacity and experience by increasing positions and staffing levels.
The third issue is that organized crime groups have become increasingly technologically advanced. They are increasing their use of sophisticated techniques to communicate with each other and increasing their use of the Internet to facilitate the commission of crimes such as prostitution, money laundering, etc.
What are the implications for law enforcement? Again, counter-surveillance is becoming a huge issue. Organized crime groups are using anti-surveillance techniques such as RF or signal monitors to find police covert surveillance equipment and are using jammers to block the communications.
Both of these create safety concerns for officers and operational impediments to the running of a successful operation. There are many examples of police officers conducting traffic stops who have had their phones and, in some cases, their police radios made non-functional because of the application of these jamming devices. Traditional investigative techniques are becoming less effective.
Among potential solutions, the first is to have a cybercrime centre for Canada. We need a national centre for combatting online Internet crime to address spamming, viruses, and botnets, etc., but also to allow local law enforcement to have an investigative body to gather evidence of money laundering, frauds, etc. Moreover, under lawful access legislation, we need to be able to monitor crime groups in online chat rooms and in areas that are currently untouchable, such as game box online sites, MSN, and PIN to PIN communications on a BlackBerry, etc.
Lawful access legislation needs to be passed to enable police to monitor communication devices more effectively. Telephone companies and Internet service providers must be compelled to provide a back door for law enforcement to intercept private communications when we come to them with a judicial authorization for such interception.
In addition, law enforcement needs to be able to access subscriber information for cellphones and Internet IP addresses without a warrant. Legislation to make it illegal for citizens to sell, possess, use, or import signal jammers is also critical.
Finally, there is education. Organized crime relies on its ability to prey on the naive and the vulnerable. We have to do a far better job of educating the public. This has to include kids as early as elementary school so that they get the proper message on drugs and cyber-predatory behaviour that leads to approaches for prostitution and gang involvement. We need to continue this right through to high school.
How else does one explain the continuing success of some Internet frauds that are continually perpetrated on the public with great success when, to law enforcement and the educated, it's just ridiculous to think anybody could even be victimized by these types of approaches? There needs to be a national commitment to education to reduce the levels of victimization.
Thank you for this opportunity today.