Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this legislation has to do with the whole nature of Canadian law, the background with respect to the State Immunity Act, and the jurisprudence that has evolved regarding notions of what it means for the victim to have a civil remedy. Since the State Immunity Act currently gives no immunity to states for damage they cause in Canada, then cases against foreign states that will be brought under the government's proposed legislation will primarily involve acts outside of Canada--as I hope to indicate, for example, suing Iran directly, not just suing Islamic Jihad, which is sponsored by Iran, for killing a Canadian abroad.
I might add parenthetically that if you take the Lockerbie situation, it would not have been possible to go after Libya under the current wording in this legislation. That was why I proposed the legislation that you should be able to go after the state sponsor, Libya itself, for the Lockerbie terrorist act.
What we have here, I regret to say, and I will make this point once again so the government might reconsider, is that the government is in effect being soft on terror and harder on the victims. This government that purports to speak in the name of the victims—and we all want to protect victims—should be giving an effective civil remedy to those victims and not privileging the state sponsors of terrorism who commit terrorist acts against those victims.
Now, with an act of terror committed by the state of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or in the Libyan Lockerbie situation, they will be immune from a civil suit as a result of the government not wishing to respond to an amendment we propose that would give citizens a remedy.
With regard to this particular amendment, what we want to do under.... Because under proposed subsection 4(2) of the present bill, for a person who is victimized by a terrorist act outside of Canada to sue in a Canadian court, he or she must establish a real and substantial connection to the jurisdiction in which he or she is launching the suit--i.e., here in Canada. So the only connection to Canada will be the Canadian citizenship or permanent residency of the victim.
But in recent court rulings, Mr. Chairman, it's likely that citizenship and permanent residency alone—and I think the government realizes this—will not be sufficient to establish a real and substantial connection to Canada. Therefore, international law experts we've consulted, and I suspect they are the same international law experts they would be consulting, are of the view that it is possible that a significant number of actions against foreign states under this legislation may be precluded or stopped on jurisdictional grounds before they get to the merits, which would undermine the intention of the legislation.
There are cases pending before the Supreme Court of Canada on this very point. Therefore it's essential that the legislation explicitly state that a person's Canadian citizenship or permanent residency status is enough to establish the jurisdiction of the Canadian court.
The way it should be done is in proposed subsection 4(2), which we are speaking of here. We should be deleting the four lines—and I think this supports the next amendment put forward by Mr. Goguen—and maybe word it that for certainty, it is sufficient to establish that the plaintiff is a Canadian citizen or permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in order to establish the jurisdiction of the Canadian court with respect to the cause of action referred to in this section.
It's similar to what Mr. Goguen is suggesting; the language, I suggest to you, may be somewhat more specific with regard to the same remedy and the same effectiveness that the government seeks.
Again, Mr. Chairman, we are seeking only to make the legislation effective.