That's hardly a point of order.
I think I did say at the outset that we're speaking to ones we're opposed to. If we were supportive of it, and had good reasons for supporting it, we might speak to it, but we'd be more inclined to group them if there were a series of them along the same lines.
No, my concerns here are that this follows on from clause 60. Clause 60 establishes this administrative segregation without any independent adjudicator, one of the consequences of which is clause 61, proposed section 37, which says that when you're in administrative segregation you have the same rights and conditions except for ones you can't enjoy because of limitations specific to the administrative segregation area.
So if there are no exercise possibilities, if there are no opportunities for—and I'm using a mundane example—watching television, listening to the radio, playing music, or whatever it is that might give a person some social replacement for the absence of people, then they don't get that if it's not there. There is no requirement to have reasonable conditions, no requirement to have so-called least restrictive, no requirement for an independent adjudicator who can talk about reasonable alternatives, or suggest that this situation, particular to this institution, or particular to this administrative segregation area, is unreasonable, and that reasonable alternatives exist and should be found. That's the problem I have with this particular provision.
It's one thing to set up an administrative segregation--and as you may have noticed, in principle we don't object to that. But you're going to say it's only based on the determination and the opinion of the administrative head, and then you say there can be limitations as to what can be enjoyed because of the limitations that are specific to the segregation area. Well, that basically says that if we have a certain particular inadequate area, because of the nature of the institution, or because of so much overcrowding because we've got so many prisoners now as a result of these laws that are being passed, the place is full to the nines, and we've created a new administrative segregated area, but we haven't gotten around to outfitting it yet, but you're stuck there anyway, because that's all we've got, well, that's perfectly legitimate. In fact, it's legitimized by this particular provision.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is unacceptable. You go down a road that starts off with just removing this “least restrictive”. We're just getting that out of there because that's been.... I don't know why, or you like “necessary” instead. Now, necessary also applies to the limitations of the area that are in that particular institution. Well, how many institutions do we have that have inadequate provisions for administrative segregation? What are the limitations we're talking about here? I've come up with a couple that I'm thinking of offhand, but I'm not an expert in corrections. But I do know, having been in a number of penitentiaries in this country in my work as a lawyer, that there's a great deal of variety and a great deal of disagreement about an appropriate level of an operation for a prison. Many of them are extremely old. Many of them don't have modern facilities.
It's all very well to say, “Well, you're in prison, too bad”, but we're talking here about a prison within a prison, an administrative segregation area that has further limitations that are....You've stated it in a positive way: it's called inmates' rights. They're the same rights and conditions, except those that aren't there. That's what it says--“limitations specific to the administrative segregation area” in a particular institution. Well, it's great to say you have rights if you have rights to everything except what you don't have because those limitations are specific to the administrative segregation area.
It's a use of words to deny the very rights that the section says it's designed to grant. I think that's inappropriate, and it follows from the decision to pass clause 60, which allows an institutional head to order the confinement to administrative segregation, period. I don't really see any limitation of time here. I don't see any limitation of time.
Administrative segregation can be permanent, as I read this. Maybe there's another section, and maybe Mr. Jean or somebody on the other side can point to the fact that there's a limitation here or there's a method for this administrative segregation to end. But I don't see any limitation, other than saying the inmate is to be released from administrative segregation at the earliest appropriate time. Well, that's great. Who decides what that is?
I know I'm jumping back to another clause, Mr. Chairman, but it's clause 60 that establishes the conditions. It says you're going to be deprived of these rights, essentially for as long as the administrative head considers it's appropriate to keep you in administrative segregation, but they'll let you out as early as it's appropriate to let you out.
Again, these words like “appropriate” and “necessary” are subjective in nature. They are not bound by this constitutionally recognized principle of “least restrictive”. That is a very important problem that we have with this. Clause 61 continues that level of restriction, which I'm afraid is very, very discriminatory against individuals in this situation and leaves them open to abuse or arbitrariness. It could lead to injustice inside our penitentiaries