Madame Boivin raised the point of a boxing match, which we're about to witness a couple of weeks from now. It may be outside the scope of our discussion, but if we're talking about an offence, what's a boxing match if not an assault with the defence of consent? In that context, the offence of assault is being committed. The act that constitutes the offence is the assault that occurs in the boxing match. The defence is one of consent, so it's not an offence. That's the paradox you were talking about, Ms. Klineberg, and it's inherent in the concept before us.
You said it right. The act that forms the subject matter of the charge is what we're talking about. If the defence is present—and the assumption here in the clause is that the defence is present if the conditions are met—then why not call it “the act that would otherwise constitute the...” or “the act that constitutes the subject matter of the charge”?
I find it confusing. I have no doubt the courts will interpret it properly, but I proposed this amendment to try to clarify things and to avoid the paradox that you're talking about. I don't want to engage in an argument with you over it. I just wanted to make my points.