I can respond with my own words from Tuesday.
This is not quite the same as what I was suggesting that the current approach is. If I look at the English version of what you've proposed, the act that is committed has to be found to be reasonable. If we say, “From the circumstances as perceived by the accused,” and we don't say, “the reasonable perceptions of the accused,” we are permitting the analysis of the reasonableness of the actions to be framed according to the purely subjective and potentially unreasonable viewpoint of the accused.
This is different from what I was suggesting on Tuesday, which was that the reasonable perceptions of the accused are a factor to be taken into account, along with all of the other factors, in determining whether the action itself was reasonable from an objective viewpoint.
I see what this motion is trying to accomplish. It's just slightly different from the discussion we had on Tuesday. It's a bit problematic, because there's confusion over whether or not the unreasonable perceptions of the accused guide the determination of what's reasonable in the circumstances.