Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I listened with interest to Madame Boivin's comment and I would like to remind the committee that the question of reasonableness has always been a part of our law when it comes to issues of mistake, or mistaken fact.
For example, if I embrace someone under the mistaken apprehension that they are consenting and it turns out they were not consenting, the court would most definitely wish to examine whether or not my belief was reasonable.
This is a long tradition in Canadian law, and it is reflected in the existing versions of this provision, as the official mentioned. I think that if we were to depart from it, we would be creating a new perspective on things that would increase the confusion we are trying to avoid.
Apart from that, I would point out that as a matter of interpretation when we qualify the words in this way—“belief on reasonable grounds”—we are admitting only of that one kind of belief. If we remove that qualification, then we are admitting the possibility that other forms would be operative, so you might just as well amend it to say “they believe reasonably or unreasonably” as take out the qualification “unreasonable belief”. As a result, I have to oppose this motion.