I'm not so sure that adding the word “extreme” would be particularly useful. What I think would be a better suggestion, frankly, is to look at how the courts have defined that and include those hallmarks of hatred in the legislation. They attempt to further clarify what hatred is. They are very clear. They're set out in the Lemire case and I think they're very helpful. What they do, in point form—they make five points—is present the characteristics of hate speech. I think those would be of much more useful guidance to tribunals and to courts looking at challenges to the legislation to put against the facts of the speech itself.
If I might add one other point on the notion that a penalty chills speech, I'm not exactly in favour of removing the penalty. I would draw your attention to the case of Hill and the Church of Scientology, which was a defamation case. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a damage award of $800,000, notwithstanding the fact that the argument was made that this would chill speech. If you compare that penalty to the rather small penalties in the Canadian Human Rights Act that are designed to compensate the victim and to address the seriousness of the effects of hate speech, I don't think they're out of line.