Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, members of the committee, for affording me this opportunity.
Let me start out by specifying that I appear today as an individual, but I hope as an individual with some relevant background experience. I am the immediate past president of the Canadian Jewish Congress, which during my tenure was recognized as the leading voice for the Jewish community. I am currently the president of the Canadian Peres Center for Peace, and I've had the privilege—in my view it is a great privilege—of acting on behalf of the Canadian Human Rights Commission in the matter of the Internet hate site that was maintained by Ernst Zundel. That was the first successful proceeding brought under subsection 13(1). I've also had opportunities to appear at all levels of court up to and including the Supreme Court of Canada to defend the constitutionality of subsection 13(1) and its analogues.
This morning, however, I do not come clothed in any other authority, and I hope simply to raise a few points with you for your consideration. Let me give you the overall perspective.
It is my view that subsection 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act is an important resource in protecting vulnerable communities from the harm caused by hate propaganda. It is constitutionally appropriate in a free and democratic society because it deals only with dangerous and harmful speech and is not concerned simply with offensive speech. It deals with dangerous and harmful speech in a way that minimally impairs the ability of Canadians to debate freely important social and political issues, including the ability to take strong and controversial positions.
The Criminal Code, on the other hand, especially section 319, which criminalizes some aspects of incitement speech, is not an adequate substitute for subsection 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. It also follows that it's not advisable to restrict the definition of hate to advocating violence, which, as Mr. Toews has ably demonstrated, is really what underpins the Criminal Code.
That's not to say that subsection 13(1) is without issues or problems. There are many ways in which the way subsection 13(1) is currently administered could be significantly improved so as to, among other things, weed out frivolous complaints at an early stage, to accelerate the pace of the hearings, to better protect the legitimate rights of respondents by levelling the playing field, and crucially, as Mr. Toews said, to repeal the penalty provisions that are attached to the current provision. Let me simply specify a couple of points.
First, it's important to note that subsection 13(1) does not deal with speech in the abstract. It does not deal with all written, let alone all oral, communications. It deals with a single medium of communication, namely the Canadian telecommunication system and notably the Internet and computer-generated telephone messages, what we today call robocalls.
It is important to remember that the regulation of telecommunications for content is not unfamiliar. On the broadcasting side, the CRTC on a daily basis engages in regulation on the basis of content. The regulation of speech outside of the broadcasting context is also not as unfamiliar as some would portray it as being. In fact the regulation of speech in our society is not confined to prohibiting someone from yelling “Fire!” in a crowded theatre. Let me just remind the committee of some examples.
We have a law of defamation, which regulates the content of speech and attaches penalties to speech. We have the principle of contempt of court, which regulates speech dealing with the justice system. We have regulation of advertisements addressed to children. We have regulation of advertisements of dangerous products, like tobacco and alcohol. We have regulation of the strictest sort dealing with pornography and, most importantly, child pornography, including merely cartoon or even verbal representations.
The key in every case is that this regulation is geared to preventing harm and to saving society from danger.
Is hate speech dangerous? To ask the question is to answer it. History provides the clearest examples of the mortal dangers—that is, dangerous to life—that hate speech can carry. Study Nazi propaganda in the thirties. Study Cambodian propaganda in the seventies. Study anti-Tutsi propaganda in Rwanda in the nineties. Study racist propaganda in the former Yugoslavia of the nineties. You will get your answer.
Does subsection 13(1) target only dangerous speech, or is it aimed at politically incorrect speech? Because of the definition given by Chief Justice Dickson in the Taylor case in the Supreme Court of Canada, the regulation is strictly confined to the most extreme kinds of speech. I won't go into the legal definitions here, but they are extremely rigorous. Even Professor Moon, in his remarks, has acknowledged that subsection 13(1) has only been used, up to now, on speech that is at the far end of hate propaganda.
The Criminal Code, in my submission, is not an adequate substitute or an adequate basis on which to protect society from these sorts of dangers. Mr. Toews has given fine examples of it. Let me simply add that the target of prosecution is the wrongdoer, and, appropriately, we set high standards to protect against wrongful convictions.
The focus of the Human Rights Act is the message itself, not the wrongdoer. Its purpose is to protect society from the baleful consequences of those most dangerous messages.