First off, I do think it's positive that there's a definition being added. I also think it's encouraging that the definition that is being added is adopting principles from international law. I think that's a good practice for us in general terms—not just in this instance, but in many cases.
I have a question for Mr. Rathgeber, and probably a question for our experts as well, but before that, in the case of discrimination based on religion or some other ground, there has to be a discretion left with the Human Rights Tribunal to assess the validity of the claim that one is of one religion or another religion. I think the proposed amendment inserts a degree of skepticism that we've trusted the boards to work through in other grounds of discrimination. I don't see why this one would be different.
My question for Mr. Rathgeber and the panel comes back to the genesis of the wording that Mr. Rathgeber has chosen. We know the wording that has been put forward in NDP-2 had its genesis in internationally recognized principles. With regard to the wording that is chosen in the alternate definitions, is there some body of case law, or something we can point to, that will help us have some predictor of how these are going to be interpreted—in terms of how they're going to be different?
I suppose the same question would go to our legal experts here. Do you have any commentary or advice you could offer with respect to the likely legal interpretation of the contentious words, which appear to be “deeply felt”? I think that would be of great benefit to the committee.
Thank you.