That's a great question, but I think we need to distinguish somewhat between two different and dangerous trades. One is the smuggling of materials that could be used directly to make a nuclear bomb, that is highly enriched uranium or plutonium, which so far—knock on wood—has mostly been not only a not-organized crime but what I like to call a comically disorganized crime. It's mostly sort of part-time hustlers and has been rare and not an organized operation.
Then the different situation is these technology supply networks that are mostly run by states, although one of the odd things about the A.Q. Khan network was, rather than it being driven by the demand of a state, it was driven in part by the available supply from the network looking for customers. These are sophisticated operations dealing with companies with sensitive technologies, well-to-do engineers. They are sophisticated in the use of front companies and various other means of hiding what they're doing. But they are really about acquiring the technology to make this kind of material, and then to make a weapon from it, rather than acquiring the highly enriched uranium, which is really more of the terrorist problem. Technology is really more of the state problem. I think it's implausible that terrorists, even if they could get relevant technologies, would be able to enrich uranium or produce plutonium on their own.
So I would argue that Bill S-9 would help us with the terrorist problem, in part because it makes illegal and imposes these very substantial penalties on acts such as smuggling or unauthorized possession of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. I think there are other things we need to do that will help us with the technology problem, including taking action, as Canada did, to arrest these kinds of players who are trying to get these kinds of technologies.