Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My thanks to all the witnesses here for coming to help us hopefully improve Bill C-13.
But I would like to tell Mr. Fraser and Ms. Guthrie from the outset that we share your opinion that it would have been preferable to divide the bill. The representatives from the Boys and Girls Clubs of Canada are saying the same thing. We introduced a motion in the House to divide the bill, listing exactly the same sections that the Boys and Girls Clubs of Canada mentioned in their brief. Unfortunately, we were not successful.
Everyone has their own expertise and there are people who have extremely specialized expertise in privacy, in electronic surveillance, in all kinds of areas. Unfortunately, we have to get down to the task and look at all the provisions.
I do not want to rain on your parade, but we tried and the government said no. That being said,
you raised some quite interesting points in connection with some of my concerns. I might like us to talk about them in a little more depth.
I do not want to ignore what the representatives of the Boys and Girls Clubs of Canada said. I heard their message. We had a meeting about it too. Actually, that was where the idea of dividing the bill came up. Most people do not see a lot of problems in the first part, but they see huge ones in the second part.
Mr. Fraser, you talked about the burden of proof. The burden of proof, to me, is the difference between reasonable grounds to suspect and reasonable and probable grounds to believe. Those terms are a little more familiar for those who have practiced criminal law.
For the benefit of the committee, could you highlight the distinction between the two? I do not know if you have read the minister's response. He seems to feel that a burden of proof based on reasonable and probable grounds to suspect is already well accepted by the courts.
I will ask you the same question, Ms. Guthrie.
Mr. Fraser, could you also spell out for me your position on immunity. I am not sure I completely grasped it.
Section 487.0195(1) says as long as it is “not prohibited by law ”. What specifically does that refer to? Does it affect the Charter? If I have the right to privacy, does the fact of distributing private information about me go against that? So would that immunity not exist?
Could you spell out for us a little more clearly and precisely the hidden cases in which immunity would not apply, if there are any? I would like to see whether the risk that most privacy experts have told us about in section 487.0195(1) is as great as they say.
If any other witness has an opinion that they would like to share with us on this matter, please feel free to do so.