Mr. Chair, if I heard her correctly, I think Madam Péclet said that it was the government's position that 487.0195(2) codifies section 25 of the Criminal Code. I believe that's what I heard. Of course, that wouldn't make any sense because section 25 is already in the Criminal Code. What it attempts to do is codify what is in the jurisprudence interpreting section 25 of the Criminal Code.
These cases have been mooted by us previously. I have yet to hear from any of my friends in the opposition any discussion of any of the relevant case law. They gloss over it. We've referred to several cases which you can find in the testimony before this committee. That's what we believe it will do.
With respect to this particular standard, as she will know, it is always inferred by the court that any such information supplied is done so to law enforcement on the basis of reasonableness and in good faith. That's the standard the court expects, and when the court has any reason to suspect that is not the case, it would make a different ruling.
In addition, the criteria of reasonable grounds and good faith are proposed to be added in a way that would appear not to apply to the voluntary preservation and production itself, but only to a person who would assist another person doing so. That's a drafting error.
In addition, only including reasonable grounds and good faith for the assistance could be interpreted as only applying the reasonableness and good faith criteria to the person who was aiding and not to the direct preservation or production of the information itself.
On that basis, Mr. Chair, we will not be supporting this amendment.