Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Our amendment concerns the immunity granted under subsection 487.0195(2). We are offering the government a slightly better alternative.
It is important to note that one form of immunity is provided in electronic surveillance cases. That immunity is very reasonable and is already being used by the people concerned. There should be some consistency in the Criminal Code to ensure that the immunity enjoyed by peace officers, telecommunications companies and all people concerned in electronic surveillance matters is the same as that already provided for under the Criminal Code. It would be quite reasonable for that to be the case.
It is true that many witnesses are in favour of immunity in this area, but they are not necessarily in favour of virtually unconditional immunity as is provided for here. I am 99.9% certain that no witness said unconditional immunity was desirable. That much is clear. The government cannot tell me the contrary.
I have just provided a quick overview of the testimony of the federal ombudsman for victims of crime, and she never argued in favour of the kind of unconditional immunity the government is now trying to grant to telecommunications companies.
Why could the government not go halfway and grant those companies the same immunity in electronic surveillance cases as is already provided in the Criminal Code? I already know Mr. Dechert's response. He will tell us that section 25 of the code already codifies that immunity. Section 487.14 also codifies immunity. Why then add a new immunity that is inconsistent with the logic of the two sections already in the Criminal Code? We must be consistent.
It would be reasonable to accept amendment NDP-25 so that immunity in electronic surveillance cases is the same as that provided with respect to information sharing.