Mr. Chair, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and especially to Ms. Françoise Boivin, the member for Gatineau, for giving me the opportunity today to express my concerns about clause 20 of Bill C-32.
First, the cause of victims of crime must be separated from partisan politics and be based on a fair and complete interpretation of the law and the facts, and not on rhetoric.
Second, this new right of victims can be understood only in light of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Constitution of Canada, which states that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person. In this case, we are talking about the right of victims of crime and their families to life and security.
Third, the provisions in Bill C-32 on victims' rights to information, participation, protection and restitution are purely declaratory and do not impose any specific obligations or responsibilities on justice system stakeholders, or create any enforcement procedure, timeframe or sanction in case of failure. Here I am referring to clauses 28 and 29 in particular.
These provisions are merely statements of principle that do not impose any constraints on anyone. One could almost be satisfied with them because our courts generally comply with these general principles, if it were not for the new provisions that are completely foreign to the cause of victims and cast doubt on the legislator's real intent, which in light of clause 20 in particular seems increasingly vague and ambiguous. One would be justified in asking the legislator who suggested clause 20 in a bill for victims, because whoever it was is clearly not a victim. In fact, that is my question for you. Who suggested this clause?
If the legislator had wanted to respond to calls from the police and crown attorneys, it could have proceeded differently and introduced a separate bill that could have been called the Police and Crown Immunity Bill. However, that would have been a clear indication of federal interference in the civil law of responsibility, which is a provincial jurisdiction. This would have led to another constitutional debate before our courts, in addition to giving our police officers and crown attorneys quasi-judicial status in the meantime.
Fortunately, in Canada we can still sue police officers and crown attorneys for professional misconduct in civil court, or go through their professional association. However, if a law on immunity of the police and the Crown were passed, or if clause 20 becomes law, which is what we anticipate, it will no longer be possible to sue them in civil court without causing a constitutional dispute.
Could it be that the government does not want to hold this debate openly and directly, yet still wants to create this immunity using the cause of victims?
Fourth, clause 20 of the bill is reminiscent of some Criminal Code provisions, which we will come back to. Regarding clause 20, I want to point to the impairment of the police's discretionary power, and the adverse effect on the prosecutor's discretionary power.
In addition to clause 20, there is part IV of the Criminal Code, entitled “Offenses Against the Administration of Law and Justice”, which applies to everyone without discrimination. These are provisions on corruption and perjury. These provisions have proven effective in court.
However the wording of this new clause 20, which purports to protect police and prosecutorial discretion, is indicative of a spectacular shift, because the legislator is confirming the immunity of the police and the Crown from potential complaints or recriminations by victims of crime and their families for professional misconduct or negligence, without saying so in so many words. This could even open the door to criminal prosecutions of victims and their families if the police or the Crown, or both, should be offended by their statements in the media, for example.
How did we get to this point? Simply put, the victim must not interfere with the discretion of the police, the Crown, and so on. Otherwise, the victim risks being charged with interfering with the administration of justice, according to clause 20.
And since the bill does not set out any objective criterion for determining what constitutes interference with the administration of justice by a victim, for example, we are to understand that the criterion is subjective and therefore left to the discretion of the police and the Crown.
If this bill were passed as is, there would be a significant reduction in victims' rights when it comes to their freedom to express their opinions publicly or privately. Public debate demands that victims and public commentators, journalists, editorial writers, lawyers and other stakeholders be able to express their opinions and even their anger or dissatisfaction regarding legal matters freely and publicly.
The reasons for including this provision in a bill to help victims of crime and their families are unclear, but it is reasonable to think that they have something to do with a hidden agenda whose implications are impossible to know. Based on subjective criteria, clause 20 seeks to limit the scope of a bill that does not offer anything new.
Did this provision come out of some sort of union agenda of police officers or crown attorneys? It is reasonable to think so. In Quebec, we are all aware of what police officers and crown attorneys are capable of when it comes to strikes or work slowdowns. I will come back to this with some examples.
I therefore submit that clause 20 is an attempt to abuse the law and is designed to derail a bill whose purpose was to help vulnerable people: victims of crime and their families. But what is most disturbing is that the police and crown attorneys will be able to use this bill to protect themselves if they are sued for professional misconduct in connection with high-profile criminal trials and labour relations conflicts. Ultimately, the police and crown attorneys will have used victims to serve their own ends.
I would now like to make a some separate comments regarding the 2012 symposium.
Quebec's main contribution to standing up for victims came out of the 2012 symposium organized by Marc Bellemare, the former Minister of Justice and Attorney General in the Liberal government of the Right Honourable Jean Charest, and attended by the Honourable Christian Paradis, then minister and Quebec lieutenant, and the Honourable Bertrand Saint-Arnaud, Minister of Justice and Attorney General in the Parti Québécois government, as guests of honour. The governments of Quebec and Canada were sponsors of the event. I assisted senator Pierre-Hughes Boisvenu, who led the workshop on a bill of rights for victims and their families. In my opinion, the symposium was an historic event, a clear indication that vulnerable people rightfully want rights, dignity and legitimacy, both because of the exceptional number of participants and because of the quality of the speakers.
The main conclusions of the symposium were that victims or their families should have the right to representation by a lawyer whose fees and expenses would potentially be covered by provincial legal aid, and who would potentially exercise a veto in a plea bargain, and even appeal a verdict or sentence in a criminal case on their behalf. However, all the recommendations that came out of the symposium organized by Marc Bellemare were ignored.
To illustrate the importance and appropriateness of having an independent attorney for victims, I submit the following two cases to you orally. The first case is the murder of the late Jacques Jong and the fictitious case of Stéphanie. However, since I am running out of time, I will simply conclude by saying that for now, the goal of my testimony today is much more humble than trying to bring about the recommendations of the 2012 symposium. I simply ask that you remove clause 20 from Bill C-32. This clause is not relevant or useful or appropriate for a law that has to do with victims. Moreover, if police and crown attorneys want a debate on their immunity, they can do so in the context of an independent, separate bill, and not in the context of Bill C-32.
Thank you.