Mr. Adler has escaped my clutches, so I'm going to have to ask either of you gentlemen, Mr. Fogel or Mr. Herman, about this point.
Prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to proceed by indictment or summary is one of those areas of virtually untrammelled discretion. I think that point was made very powerfully.
I tried to put myself in the position of the people who drafted this bill and decided to make these offences of advocating terrorism or issues involving promoting genocide hybrid offences, and I tried to figure out why they did this. One has to assume that there was some purpose in doing so, rather than just sweeping them into this large category of hybrid offences.
As I say, you've been very powerful, so can I invite you to reflect on what might have led them to do this? Is it your view, like many of the other things we've heard about, that this was a law of unintended consequences, that it was not intentional but simply a lapse, and that we should fix it because it was unintended? Or could there have been an intent on their part to, for example, deal with those things which we see in situations in small towns where people make anti-Semitic slurs and so forth? They go unchecked in the criminal system precisely because they go by indictment, and that is sort of the heavy artillery. Some might say that if you use summary prosecution, you might find yourself bringing more people to justice for that activity.
I'm trying to put myself in the position of how this happened, the position of those who drafted this, and give them the benefit of the doubt and understand why they might have done this. Have you reflected on that?