Perhaps I'll field that one.
I think it's understood that in Carter “the right to life, liberty and security of the person” is engaged by legislation that would prohibit an individual's right to self-determine their own medical treatment and choices. The question would be not whether there's a breach of life, liberty, or security of the person, but rather whether it's being done “in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”, which is the language at the end of section 7.
Again, in the Carter case, the court seemed to have little difficulty in concluding that the infringements that were considered in Carter were not done in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. In my submission, the same conclusion would flow here.
The fact of the matter is that Carter was being decided in a factual context, and none of the plaintiffs in Carter were individuals who were trying to rely on advance directives, so obviously the court decided what it had to. That wasn't an issue before the court, but in my submission, the analysis that was used by the court in Carter applies with equal strength to a person in the situation of someone who is having to rely on an advance directive.
The only distinction, of course, is that the person relying on the directive is unable to, as it were, repeat the provision of consent at the time of the medically assisted death. That's the only factual difference, but in my submission, that does not give rise to any legal distinction that permits that case to be distinguished from the people who were under consideration in Carter.