Thank you. It's a pleasure and privilege to be here with you today.
As was mentioned, I am a law professor at Queen's University. I've been working on family justice issues for close to 40 years. I've written quite a few books and articles, and my work is cited by the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as by other courts.
I am a member of the board of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Ontario, which is an interdisciplinary organization, and they support many of the positions that I have, or I support them. I think their brief is going to be posted for you tomorrow.
As will be discussed or referred to, I have also been working with professors Rachel Birnbaum, Michael Saini, Francine Cyr and Karine Poitras on a series of papers around this new legislation and related topics.
Broadly, I and all those with whom I work support the direction of this legislation very much, and there is a great need for change. The legislation was enacted in 1986, and in fact many of the terms and ideas come from 1968. Canada is one of the last countries to bring about reform.
We have already seen reforms in a number of provinces. Many of the provisions of the act, such as imposing duties on parents to try to resolve conflict and so on are very important. The provisions around views of the child are again very important and reflect present practice. The provisions around family violence I think are very important, as are the provisions around relocation as well. I have written about many of these topics.
You have my brief. I would certainly be happy to answer questions. As you know, my time is limited, so I am just going to touch on a few points.
First of all, in regard to proposed subsection 16.1(6), family dispute resolution, the definition of that refers to negotiation, collaboration, mediation. I would submit to you—and I know many others would—that it should also refer to counselling, and perhaps parenting coordination. Certainly one of the things that courts should be able to do is refer or order the parents and child, if necessary, to go to counselling. Often that's the best way to resolve matters, and there is a large amount of research about the value of counselling—not for everybody, but it certainly should be an option.
Right now there is a division in case law. Some judges say that of course we can do this and others are saying, no, we can't, because there is no explicit provision; we can't send people to counselling in criminal court, so why should we be able to do it here? Therefore I would urge you to include counselling.
The second thing I would specifically say is that in proposed subsection 16.2(1) refers to “maximum parenting time”. I would urge you to change the title. The title is actually a relic there. The present legislation, as you know, reads “maximum contact” time. Now you've called it “maximum parenting time”, and those are very different concepts, and indeed the actual provision does not relate to the title. The title has been used by courts in previous cases, so I would urge you to change the title, perhaps saying what reflects the section, which is parenting time consistent with best interests. There may be other words, but “maximum parenting time” may be misinterpreted as equal parenting time, and I'm going to come to that. I think that's very problematic, so I would urge you to change that.
One more specific comment is about relocation. I think it's very welcome that the bill has a scheme for dealing with relocation cases. Largely, I support it. I know that my colleague Professor Thompson was here, and I endorse much of what he said.
One thing that wasn't said was in regard to one parent wanting to move and giving the other one written notice of moving. The way this is drafted right now, the parent who is not moving has to file an objection with the court. That means that you've begun a court proceeding right away, which is both difficult and expensive, and it may be unnecessary. While it could be useful in some cases, I would suggest that it would be sufficient to file a written objection, perhaps in a prescribed form, rather than actually having to go to court.
In my remaining time, I would just like to focus on an issue that I know you've been dealing with, which is the argument for a presumption of equal parenting time. I would urge you not to go in that direction. I know you've had some witnesses come and testify about that. I think their research is very problematic in many respects, and I can get into the details of that.
The work of professors Kruk and Fabricius does not reflect the majority of social scientists in North America, or really in the world.
Most people who have worked in the field and done research, including the people I've collaborated with, do not support equal parenting. They support shared parenting. They support the idea of equal parenting in appropriate cases. However, they're very concerned about the effect of a presumption of equal parenting.
I should say that although you've heard things suggesting it's being done around the world, there's only one jurisdiction in the world at this point that has a presumption of equal parenting, and that is Kentucky. Every other jurisdiction that's looked at this has resisted those kinds of words, and jurisdictions that have moved in that direction, like Australia, have actually come back. There are many concerns about it in terms of its effect on cases, and in particular the experience....
I should say that although he didn't highlight it in his presentation to you, the article of Professor Fabricius—again, I think if you're going to look at social science research, you have to go back and look at the original study—points out that even in Arizona, which has a very weak form of an equal parenting approach, there's been an increase in litigation. I think there would be a widespread concern that if you go a presumption, it will increase the amount of litigation. It will expose women in particular, but also in some cases children, to unnecessary risk.
While there are many situations in which equal parenting time is appropriate, there are also many situations in which it's not appropriate. For example, there could be a situation—and there are many of these situations—of people having a child out of wedlock, or the child is born before they separate, and only one parent has lived with the child. When the child is two, the father comes along—often it's the father—and says, “Parliament said that I have a right to equal parenting time.” I think that would be highly problematic. It's exactly in those kinds of cases that I think it would be used.
I know that as a value, many Canadians—and you've heard about the public opinion polls—support the role of both parents in the lives of their children. If you want to, you can call that equal parenting, in the sense that they're both parents and they both have a role, for example, in naming the child, and they both should be involved, but to start with that presumption—particularly in the high-conflict cases, in which that presumption will make a difference—I think is highly problematic. It's not a coincidence that every other jurisdiction except Kentucky has rejected this.
We've had discussions, and in fact I can give you data. The vast majority of Canadian family lawyers, who I think are very much settlement-focused, are opposed to this kind of presumption. I know there are some lawyers who take a different view, but we did a study, and over 80% of family lawyers have a concern about a statutory presumption of equal time.
I could certainly go on, but my time is up, so thank you very much for your attention.