I, with respect to Mr. Rankin, would oppose this particular amendment. The Supreme Court was clear in its decision that one of the criterion for medical assistance in dying is that one gives fair clear consent. I believe that by clear consent the Supreme Court was contemplating contemporaneous consent.
This motion seems to conflate, on the one hand, the inability to give instructions with the ability to change one's mind. It sets a very dangerous precedent. I would note that in the province of Quebec, which we've been reminded studied Bill 52 for six years, in three national assemblies, three Quebec governments, the advance directives were in the initial legislation, but they were withdrawn on the basis that the risks could not be sufficiently mitigated.
There was a clear body of evidence before the special joint committee and evidence before this committee that there are inherent risks involved. The government, in the legislation, has said that there may be an opportunity. In fact, the government's intention is to study this further.
I'm not opposed to studying any issue further, but I believe that given the time in which Parliament needs to pass legalisation and having regard for the inherent risks that have been identified and the underlying complexities involved in advance directives, it would not be responsible to amend the legislation at this time to include advance directives.