One example is a case that was actually argued in the Ontario court that we were involved with. It deals with the “right to housing” issue. A number of organizations intervened in that case.
There are statistics showing, for instance, among the homeless and under-housed population that there is a very high population of racialized communities—aboriginals, women, women with disabilities—so they are terribly under-housed or homeless. The challenge was the lack of a housing strategy to deal with that issue.
In that context, of course section 15 is one argument in the sense that the lack of policy has a disproportionate impact on these disadvantaged groups; but section 7 is also an issue concerning the right to security, so that issue was also being argued.
If that case were to be funded by the court challenges program, then the court challenges program would only fund the section 15 arguments and not the section 7.
I can tell you when I was on the panel, it's very artificial sometimes. You have to just ignore the section 7 thing, but in fact the two are somewhat related. I think more and more so as well, with the court coming more to a realization that equality might be a principle of fundamental justice under section 7, that the two sections are actually becoming more and more connected.