Paragraph 56 is actually from Justice McLachlin, who's position on the validity of those sections was in dissent.
Paragraph 232 of the majority decision of Justices LeBel and Deschamps states:
Health, which Rand J. mentioned, cannot always justify action by Parliament in relation to the criminal law. This passage must therefore also be considered in the context of Rand J.’s definition of the criminal law.
Later in the same paragraph it states:
In our view, therefore, it is not enough to identify a public purpose that would have justified Parliament’s action. Indeed, it might be hoped that Parliament does not act unless there is a public purpose that justifies its doing so. Where its action is grounded in the criminal law, the public purpose must involve suppressing an evil or safeguarding a threatened interest.
With regard to suppressing an evil, the provisions in question pertain only to requiring the disclosure of genetic information and do not in any way prohibit the use of this information for discriminatory purposes. Clauses 3 to 7 do not in any way prohibit the use of this information for discriminatory purposes.
Is it an evil to require the disclosure of genetic information for the purpose of forming a contract? In my opinion, the answer is no. It is a question of public policy, but that is not the same thing.