I don't believe it would. I don't believe that would be consistent with the charter, to simply remove the ability to argue mistake of fact about whether there was consent.
It's important to note that mistaken belief in consent is something that is only considered in the criminal trial when the crown has proven that there in fact was no consent. That's when the issue of mistake becomes important. So it is a question of fact, but it is appropriate for Parliament to inject some values into what are the circumstances under which we will excuse someone from making that mistake of fact.
The Supreme Court has said that beliefs about consent cannot rest on mistakes of law. They made that clear in Ewanchuk. My argument is that Parliament has also done that in the limitations in section 273.1. That is why, with respect to that specific point, I am a little concerned that the language in the current clause 20, proposed subparagraph 273.2(a)(iii), which I pointed out, does make it seem as though what is being referred to is simply a factual context. I would suggest some reference of words to indicate that what is being referred to here is the legal understanding of consent.