Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Moore, for proposing this amendment and for your comments.
I'm concerned that this amendment would defeat the purpose of the bill. Even though this is criminal legislation, I'm not going to get into motive and ascribing intent here, Mr. Moore, as we've discussed already. Mere expressions of personal points of view do not amount to a practice, service or treatment and they're not caught by the definition.
I've made my views well known throughout the discussion at this committee. As I said to Cardinal Collins the other day, I think the conversations in the confessional are not in any way going to be impeded going forward by this legislation, nor are conversations with parents or counsellors, so I'm going to oppose this amendment.
The second point is that the “for greater certainty” clause provides examples of what definitions already exist. Listing a group of situations that might be captured here.... We've had a discussion—and thank you, Ms. Levman, for talking to us about statutory interpretation. I remember arguing statutory interpretation cases in my younger days as a lawyer, and I avoided it later purposely.
Judges do their very best to interpret legislation based on its intent. The more specific you get, the more exclusive it gets, ironically. By listing all of these additional situations, you're actually excluding others. For that reason, it creates more confusion and undermines the purpose of the bill.
Thank you, Madam Chair.