Yes, absolutely. I will try.
I have sent the French version of the report to the clerk and I will be able to send you the English version at the beginning of next week.
Our committee's work illustrates that professionals working with patients and families are able to come together and agree on standards and safeguards for MAID for mental disorders. Of course, there will be people who disagree. Indeed, in a survey of our own members, while 54% of respondents replied that MAID for mental disorders is permissible in certain circumstances, 36% disagreed. There will also be those who object on conscience grounds, but this is the case already.
In the course of doing this work, we explored the issues of assessing capacity, incurability, irreversibility, suffering and suicidality. Today I'm going to speak specifically about capacity and incurability-irreversibility, as these are identified in the charter statement as the reasons mental illnesses can be excluded as a basis for MAID access.
First, I will say a quick word about language.
Bill C-7 uses the expression “mental illness” while standard psychiatric language uses “mental disorder”. It's unclear if mental illness is a synonym for mental disorder or if it refers to a subgroup of conditions. If it's a subgroup, we don't know which conditions are included and which are excluded.
In either case, in thinking about the exclusion clause for mental illness, we are confronted by the fact that neither the Canadian nor the Quebec laws permitting MAID ever excluded persons with mental illness or disorder, nor do they make reference to diagnosis at all.
The eligibility criteria are based on the clinical circumstances of the requester. Furthermore, those who have conditions with both psychiatric and physical aspects and those who have comorbid mental and physical conditions have never been excluded, nor will they be by Bill C-7, even if the psychiatric condition motivates the request, so any rationale to exclude people whose mental disorder is their sole underlying medical condition needs to apply to this and only this group of people.
The government's stated rationale is that screening for decision-making capacity is particularly difficult and subject to a high degree of error, and that mental illness is generally less predictable than physical illness in terms of the course the illness will take over time.
I want to point out two things about the worry about assessing capacity.
If assessing capacity is difficult for people with mental illnesses, then the same difficulty ought to apply in cases of mental and physical comorbidity. There is nothing about the existence of a second, physical condition that would remove this difficulty. If anything, it makes the situation more complex. In fact, at present we do assess capacity to consent to MAID in people with mental disorders and comorbid physical conditions. Presumably, if the method works in one circumstance, we would need a specific reason that shows it does not work in the other.
The second worry is that we might make mistakes in our assessment of capacity. This is not the right way to frame the problem. Capacity is not something you get right or wrong; determining whether somebody is capable is a judgment, and in matters of judgment it's to be expected that assessors may not always agree. However, because capacity is not presumed for MAID and has to be established, if assessors cannot agree, they cannot proceed.
Regarding predictions of incurability and irreversibility, it is tempting to say that because of the finality of MAID, we should not act unless we are 100% certain. However, outside the context in which a person's natural death is reasonably foreseeable, prognostication becomes more difficult in many situations. This is not limited to situations of mental disorder. The proper clinical question is how much certainty is required in order to find someone eligible.
Reflecting on cases of people with comorbid physical and psychiatric conditions who have accessed MAID in this country reveals that the concerns raised about assessing capacity and prognosis are already part of current practice. I have explained this with some real case examples in a short document that I have sent to the clerk.
In conclusion, I don't think there's a way that withstands logical scrutiny of distinguishing all cases of mental illness as a sole underlying medical condition from other clinical problems for which MAID is permitted.
As a result, what the exclusion clause will do is show that it is acceptable to treat people with mental illnesses differently from others. The AMPQ does not accept this position. We believe our patients must be entitled to exercise the same rights as all other persons.
Thank you.