Turning to Ms. Carr, I respect the work that you do and all of the groups you represent in your interventions in previous court cases, etc. I'm just struck by the fact that when I look back at the Truchon decision, the two individuals in that case, Mr. Truchon and Madam Gladu, were themselves persons with disabilities. They themselves brought forward their claims to that judge in the Superior Court of Québec. I looked back at paragraph 681 to paragraph 690—it's a long decision—while you were testifying and found that the judge addressed head on the issue that you're raising, the equality rights of these individuals. You compared the rights of persons with disabilities with indigeneity or people who experience racism, etc. Those are important rights. This is an area I practised in prior to coming to Parliament.
What the court found is that, when you look at it from an equality rights analysis perspective, the section 7 and the section 15 rights of Mr. Truchon and Madam Gladu were in fact being violated by virtue of their inability to pursue MAID because it was restricted to the end of life. Therefore, they did do that analysis, but the conclusions are vastly different from what you indicated in your testimony. I'm just wondering if you could comment to us on that portion of her decision, because in paragraph 681 she clearly said:
By seeking to counter only one of the stereotypes that the disabled face—vulnerability—the challenged provision perhaps perpetuates another probably more pernicious stereotype: the inability to consent fully to medical assistance in dying.
What she explained is that we need to empower and give autonomy to persons with disabilities, the same autonomy that is granted to people without a disability. Could you perhaps comment on that point, Ms. Carr?