Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to all the witnesses for joining us today.
Professor Emon, I will start with you with this question.
There were two recent cases in Canada of attacks against Muslim people, solely because they were Muslim. The first is the Quebec City mosque shooting in 2017, where a young man murdered six Muslim men and injured many others. The shooter pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences with no eligibility for parole for 40 years. The Court of Appeal of Quebec declared unconstitutional the section of the Criminal Code giving judges discretion to give consecutive periods of parole ineligibility, as it was contrary to sections 7 and 12 of our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
My question isn't about that. My colleague Mr. Moore had a good interchange with the previous panel on that topic, and I think that we have good testimony on the record for that, but this case is also notable for what it did not do, which is that the prosecution decided not to pursue terrorism charges but only murder charges.
The terrorism provision was added to the Criminal Code after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, and it defines terrorism as, among other things—it's a big, long definition—“an act or omission...that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious, or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and...that intentionally causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence”.
The facts of the mosque shooting would seem to make it fall squarely within that definition, yet the prosecution decided not to pursue terrorism charges.
We'll fast-forward to three years ago today. As a matter of fact, we're marking the third anniversary of the attacks in London, and the person there was convicted of murders in the Afzaal family case. He was convicted of four counts of murder and one of attempted murder, for which he received a single life sentence, of course, after the Bissonnette case that we just talked about, but he was also found guilty of an act of terrorism. It made no difference to the sentence, yet the court and the prosecutor thought that it was important to also litigate that.
Of course, there was an extra hurdle to overcome for the prosecution in that they would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this man was motivated by hatred towards an identifiable group for religious or ideological purposes.
Professor Emon, what are your comments about that? What is the importance of deciding to pursue or not to pursue terrorism charges in cases like that? What's the message to the Muslim community, or more importantly, received by the Muslim community, about an important decision like that?