Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon, members of the committee.
My name is Catherine Claveau, and I am the president of the Barreau du Québec. Joining me from the Barreau du Québec are Michel Marchand, member of the criminal law expert group; and Nicolas Le Grand Alary, lawyer, secretariat of the order and legal affairs. Thank you for giving the Quebec bar association the opportunity to comment on Bill C‑63.
Given our experience in criminal law and human rights, our remarks will focus solely on parts 2 and 3 of the bill, the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code and the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Let's start with part 2, the Criminal Code amendments. With the significant rise in hate crimes, most of which are based on race and ethnic origin, it is paramount that the bill provide the courts with the tools to respond effectively, while ensuring they adhere to the principles of fundamental justice and Canada's constitutional requirements. That is why the Barreau du Québec supports the Quebec justice minister's call for lawmakers to remove the religious exemption in the Criminal Code for hate propaganda.
The Quebec bar association considers it essential to codify a definition of hate. On one hand, this would encourage people to report incidents while helping communities clearly understand what is prohibited. On the other, it would give all actors in the justice system, police, in particular, a clear framework within which to operate.
However, we have concerns about the definition being proposed in the bill for the term “hatred”, which is based on the decision in Whatcott. In the case, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the constitutionality of a human rights provision prohibiting hate publications. The Quebec bar association considers the key decision in criminal matters to be the 1990 decision in Keegstra. The Supreme Court relied on the analysis in Keegstra in Mugesera in 2005.
In both decisions, the Supreme Court interpreted hatred in view of the Criminal Code provisions and found that “‘hatred’ connotes emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated with vilification and detestation.” The provision could be subject to a constitutional challenge, and since the burden of proof in criminal law is not the same as it is in civil law and since individuals accused of a crime are guaranteed certain rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, we recommend that the bill apply the definition relied on in those decisions.
In addition, the bill makes it a hate crime to commit an offence under the Criminal Code or any other act of Parliament if the commission of the offence is motivated by hatred based on certain factors. Someone guilty of the new offence would be liable to imprisonment for life. The new provision refers to any act of Parliament, so it has a broad scope and is likely to capture a wide array of offences, without differentiating at all between the objective seriousness of each offence.
This new provision is contrary to the fundamental principle set out in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code, proportionality in sentencing. We therefore recommend enhancing the existing provisions in the Criminal Code so as not to create a new system of prosecution for hate crimes, alongside the current system.
Now, let's turn to part 3 of the bill, the amendments to the Canadian Human Rights Act. We welcome the fact that the bill restores section 13 of the act to address the communication of hate speech. The proposed new wording is more specific and better circumscribed, helping to balance the rights and freedoms protected by the charter. The Quebec bar association also agrees with the “hate speech” definition laid out in the bill, given that it respects the teachings of the Supreme Court in Whatcott, a case that centred on human rights.
Lastly, we question the punitive quality being introduced into the Canadian Human Rights Act under the bill. The Supreme Court wrote in Taylor and Blencoe that the purpose of the act is not to punish wrongdoing, but to prevent discrimination, and that the aim of a human rights system must be conciliation, not punishment. Under the bill in its current form, the act is being amended to include a punitive measure, something that would distort the purpose of a human rights system.
We recommend that the penalty instead be paid to the victim. Alternatively, if there is no identified or identifiable victim, we recommend that the penalty be paid to a human rights organization or a group targeted by the communication that constituted the discriminatory practice.
Like subsection 53(3) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, the bill could include the possibility of ordering the person responsible for the discriminatory practice to pay special compensation to the victim if the person was engaging or engaged in the discriminatory practice willfully or recklessly. We have provided additional comments in our brief.
We would now be glad to answer the committee's questions.
Thank you.