As I said, the case law comes to very different conclusions. We have conflicting results, and I've explained that already, but maybe I can note, as you'll likely recall, that during the study of Bill C-36 some parliamentarians did express their view that Parliament isn't precluded from imposing limits on where and how the sex trade may be conducted. That's from the Bedford case itself, in particular to protect the vulnerable and society from the harms they view as being associated with the sex trade.
These parliamentarians noted that the premise of any charter assessment has changed, because Bill C-36's objectives are significantly different from those of the previous regime. The bill would make the sex trade illegal. Bedford was dealing with a regime in which the transaction for sexual services was legal. It was a legal activity, as the Supreme Court clarified.
Parliamentarians—those in favour of the bill, of course—also noted that the bill attempts to balance the interests of those who choose sex work and are in a position to take steps to protect themselves with the interests of those who are not, by criminalizing purchasing and third party involvement while also ensuring that sex workers aren't prevented from taking certain steps to protect themselves as identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in its Bedford decision.