Thank you, Chair. Thank you to the witnesses for being here.
We're talking about the defence of extreme intoxication, and when and under what circumstances it is available for an accused person.
The minister in his earlier testimony today clarified that in order for an accused person to use this defence, he would first have to prove, using expert evidence, that he was indeed in a state of extreme intoxication. Mr. Lametti colloquially defined that as being that his body is functioning, but he's not in control of it, so I think that's useful everyday language. My understanding is that once he has proven that to the satisfaction of the judge or the jury, the burden of proof then shifts to the Crown to prove that he acted negligently.
We have a comment from Professor Kerri Froc from the University of New Brunswick, who, discussing that, recognizes the “problematic aspects of the bill, which we fear will pose nearly impossible hurdles for prosecution of intoxicated perpetrators of violence against women.” Then she goes on to suggest that maybe section 33.1 could be further revised to reverse the onus, to leave it up to the accused to prove that he had not acted unreasonably, because it's so difficult for the Crown to prove and easier for the accused to defend against. What do you say about that? It seems like a reasonable option.