I think changes to the committal process are the number one priority. That is really where Dr. Diab's case rests in terms of the demonstrable problems. I'd highlight that as part number one.
There are a number of changes that could be made. Certainly, any exculpatory evidence in the hands of either the Canadian Crown or the foreign state should be disclosed to the defence. We propose that the presumption of reliability around the record of the case that's sent by the foreign state be removed. There's a package, I guess you'd say, of issues there.
Second, a number of the bases for refusal in the act are allocated through the Minister of Justice. The minister is empowered to refuse on certain grounds, such as if the person will face double jeopardy or undue oppression. Some of those questions are inherently legal questions, and we think are not necessarily appropriately allocated to the minister, who's acting in an explicitly political capacity as well as a legal capacity.
I guess that would be number two.
Number three would be a look at restructuring the international assistance group and dividing up the functions in terms of which staff, which lawyers, are allocated to fight the case on behalf of the requesting state in our adversarial system. There's nothing inappropriate about doing that, but that branch of the office should be separate from the branch wherein the minister makes the surrender decision, so that's it's not all sort of emerging from a black box.
I would say those would be my top three.