Thank you, Chair.
I do have a comment to make on both 2(a) and 2(b). But I thought I would just back up so that I can make sure that we're all on the same page.
My reading of this amendment is that it would still replace the existing legal test, the existing definition for exploitation, with the one proposed by Bill S-224, which focuses on causing another person to provide labour or services through certain specific illicit means. The Bloc's amendment would further specify what “other similar act” means in terms of taking advantage of another person's vulnerability.
Sub 2 is more like an interpretative clause. There are factors as I understand it that a court could consider when determining whether or not that legal test is met in subsection 1. The first factor is whether or not the victim fears for their safety or the safety of a person known to them. While that is a little bit similar to the existing test in 279.04 (1) it differs because it's entirely subjective, whereas the current legal test in 279.04 (1) is an objective test. We know from appellate case law that it wouldn't determine whether or not the legal test was met but it would be something that a court could factor in, as would paragraph 2(b).
This is the one that causes me a little bit of consternation because it refers to consent. I'd like to bring the committee's attention to what is currently in subsections 279.01(2) and 279.011(2), “No consent to the activity that forms the subject-matter of a charge under subsection (1) is valid." That is consistent with what the previous speaker said, which is where these illicit means are used, the law says it doesn't matter whether someone gave what courts call an apparent yes. The coercive practices used amount to human trafficking.
I would just point that out to you as a legal and a technical matter and a potential inconsistency between 2(b) and existing subsections 279.01 (2) and 279.011 (2).
Thank you.